Thanks to Adam Myers’ insightful comments, I’ve been thinking about the ways that natural law ethics concerns natures in two ways: on the side of the agent qua agent and on the of the patient qua patient.
Companionship is good for humans and bad for intelligent sharks, let’s suppose. This means that we have reasons to promote companionship among humans and to hamper companionship among intelligent sharks. That’s a difference in reasons based on a difference in the patients’ nature. Next, let’s suppose that intelligent sharks by nature have a higher degree of self-concern vs. other-concern than humans do. Then the degree to which one has an obligation to promote the very same good–say, the companionship of Socrates–will vary depending on whether one is human or a shark. That’s a difference in reasons based on a difference in the agents’ nature.
I suspect it would make natural law ethics clearer if natural lawyers were always clear on what is due to the agent’s nature and what is due to the patient’s nature, even if in fact their interest were solely in cases where the agent and patient are both human.
Consider, for instance, this plausible thesis:
- I should typically prioritize my understanding over my fun.
Suppose the thesis is true. But now it’s really interesting to ask if this is true due to my nature qua agent or my nature qua patient. If I should prioritize my understanding over my fun solely because of my nature qua patient, then we could have this situation: Both I and an alien of some particular fun-loving sort should prioritize my understanding over my fun, but likewise both I and the alien should prioritize the alien’s fun over the alien’s understanding, since human understanding is more important than human fun, while the fun of a being like the alien is more important than the understanding of such a being. On this picture, the nature of the patient specifies which goods are more central to a patient of that nature. On the other hand, if I should prioritize my understanding over my fun solely because of my nature qua agent, then quite possibly we are in the interesting position that I should prioritize my understanding over my fun, but also that I should prioritize the alien’s understanding over the alien’s fun, while the alien should prioritize both its and my fun over its and my understanding. For me promoting understanding is a priority while for the alien promoting fun is a priority, regardless of whose understanding and fun they are.
And of course we do have actual and morally relevant cases of interaction across natures:
God and humans
Angels and humans
Humans and brute animals.
2 comments:
I think a highly relevant distinction is between people who are close to us (like, say, ourselves) and people who are "ethically distant" like, say, strangers.
My thought is that my duties to people qua patients diminish as they get further away from my central circle of concern. I have very strong reasons, qua patient, to preserve my own life and those of my immediate family, but less strong reasons to preserve the lives of distant strangers. So, for example, if my son asks me to prioritize his fun over his understanding in some instance, I have pretty strong reason to override his wishes in favor of his good, but if a stranger asks me to do so I have much less reason to override.
OTOH suppose my duties to be non-self-aggrandizing toward others are mostly agent-centered duties; yes it's annoying for others if I am self-aggrandizing but mainly this practice keeps me humble. Then my duty to be NSA in the presence of distant strangers will be about as stringent as my duty to be NSA in the presence of family.
I think the "order of charity" is grounded in the agent's nature. It is our nature that specifies which beings we should care more about. We should care more about siblings than cousins, say. But there could be beings similar to us who should care about cousins equally with siblings.
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