A difficult metaphysical question is what makes something be a property rather than a particular.
In general, heavy-weight Platonism answers the question of what makes x be F, when being F is fundamental, as follows: x instantiates the property of Fness.
It is hard to see what could be more fundamental on Platonism than being a property. So, a heavy-weight Platonist has an elegant answer as to what makes something be a property: it instantiates the second-order property of propertyhood.
5 comments:
Properties (as contemporary analytic metaphysicians use the word) are universals. So properties are either substantial essences (being human) or accidents (being red). Where's the mystery?
Doesn't the problem come back? What's an accident? What's a substantial essence?
Isn't there a "third man" problem with your solution? What makes "being a property" a property? Aren't we off on a regress?
It participates in propertyhood, no?
If we explain the concept 'property' in terms of 'participation' and 'propertyhood' I do not think that is a lot of progress. Maybe just me....
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