Beliefless Christianity

A number of authors have claimed that it is possible to practice the Christian faith without assigning a high epistemic probability to central doctrines of Christianity. Here is an interesting problem with such a practice. A central part of Christian practice is to worship Jesus Christ as God. Now, Jesus Christ is uncontroversially a man. Christianity adds that he is also God. If that additional belief is false, then we who worship Jesus Christ as God are idolaters. But it is wrong to undertake a serious risk of idolatry. Thus, it is only permissible to practice the Christian faith if by one's lights the risk of idolatry is not serious. And the only way that can be is if one assigns a high epistemic probability to the doctrine that Jesus Christ is God. Thus, it seems, at least this central doctrine of the Incarnation needs to have a high epistemic probability if one is to be morally justified in practicing the Christian faith.

There is, however, a hole in the argument. Idolatry is only a great evil if God exists. Now imagine someone who assigns a high conditional probability to the Incarnation on the condition that God exists, but who assigns a low unconditional probability to both the Incarnation and the existence of God. Such a person can reason as follows. Either God exists or not. If God does not exist, there is not much evil in idolatry, and so not much harm in worshiping Jesus as God. If God does exist, however, then probably the Incarnation is true, and the value of worshiping Jesus outweighs the risks, since the risks are small.

So, what I think my overall argument shows is that it is wrong to practice the Christian faith without assigning a high epistemic probability to the doctrine of the Incarnation if one assigns a significantly higher epistemic probability to theism. Thus, someone who comes to be convinced that theism is true but assigns a low epistemic probability to Christianity should not practice Christianity.

Objection: Perhaps it is just as morally evil to fail to worship as God someone who is in fact God as it is to worship as God someone who is not. In that case, by not practicing Christianity, one also takes on a great moral risk, and perhaps the risks cancel out.

Response: I think it not just as morally evil to fail to worship as God someone who is in fact God. As far as we know, John the Baptist did not worship Jesus as God, but we have no reason to think that this was a great evil, on the par of idolatry.