Here is a plausible connection between normativity and causal powers:
If x has a power to ϕ in C, and x is in C but does not ϕ, then x qua having that power imperfect.
x is imperfect simpliciter if x is imperfect qua having ϕ for some ϕ that x has in virtue of its nature.
(I think one can make biconditionals out of these.)
But here is a problem. By omnipotence, God has the power to make reality be such that there are horses and they are all green, and he has the power to make reality be such that there are horses and they are all red. And he has these powers in the same circumstance C, namely that of creation. He exercises only one of these two powers. So it seems that God is imperfect qua having at least one of these powers. But he has these powers in virtue of his omnipotence and hence in virtue of his nature. Hence it seems that God is imperfect simpliciter.
Here is my best solution. Revise 1 to:
- If x has a power P such that P is a power to ϕ in C, and x is in C but does not successfully exercise P, then x qua having P is imperfect.
This sounds like it is equivalent to 1. After all, this seems like a necessary truth:
- If P is a power to ϕ in C and x successfully exercises P in C, then x must ϕ.
But actually 4 need not be true. For the same entity, P, could be both a power to ϕ in C and a power to ψ in C. And if so then when the possessor of P ψs in C, that would be a successful exercise of P.
This fits really well with divine simplicity on which all of God’s causal powers are ontologically the same, and indeed are identical to God. Given that, God’s powers are always fulfilled as long as God exercises one of them. (And perhaps even ensuring that God is alone would count as an exercise of God’s creative power.)
Here is another interesting thought. When I exercise free will, I have the power to ϕ and the power to ψ where ϕing and ψing are incompatible. It seems at first sight that one of these powers is unexercised, and hence thus far I am imperfect by 1. But perhaps sometimes the power to ϕ and the power to ψ are ontologically the same entity, either my nature or a single accident of me, in virtue of which entity I can ϕ and I can ψ. If so, then either ϕing or ψing could suffice for perfection qua having that power.
And now here is a very speculative thought. When we choose between right and wrong on earth, maybe the power to choose the right and the power to choose the wrong are distinct entities. Thus, we are imperfect even if we choose the right, for the power to do the wrong is unexercised. However, this sort of imperfection is not found in heaven, because there we lack the power to choose the wrong, due to the perfection of our character. But the same question will still come up in heaven when we choose between two incompatible goods, say reciting a piece of prose or reciting a piece of verse. However, perhaps, our mind will have such a deep internal unity in heaven that our abilities to choose between the various incompatible goods will be grounded in a single entity, and so no matter what we choose, we will thus far be perfect. (Not that I think it is disastrous to admit certain kinds of imperfections in heaven, so perhaps we don’t need recourse to this.)
5 comments:
Alex
If all of God's powers are ontologically the same, then the power to ϕ in C and the power to ψ in C are the same, hence it is impossibile for God to exercise "one of them".
On divine simplicity, things get even more complicated for not only all of God’s causal powers are ontologically the same, it is also true that God’s causal powers are ontologically the same as God. And Got cannot exercise only part of himself.
In short, divine simplicity combined with God's necessity inevitably leads to a modal collapse;
This only leads to modal collapse if we accept some principle like:
(*) if x successfully exercises the power to ϕ, then x ϕs.
But (*) may not be true if the power to ϕ is the same entity as the power to ψ.
Consider this plausible analogous idea:
(**) if x successfully operates an organ of taste, then x tastes something.
But this is false. When I talk, I successfully operate the tongue, and the tongue is an organ of taste, but I need not be tasting anything. The reason (**) is false is that the same organ can be an organ for more than one function. Similarly, the same entity could be more than one causal power.
What is true is:
(**b) if x successfully operates an organ of taste qua organ of taste, then x tastes something.
And similarly:
(*b) if x successfully exercises the power to ϕ qua power to ϕ, then x ϕs.
However, (*b) does not yield modal collapse.
Alex
We are talking about an ultimately simple being. Your tongue analogy only works for complex entities. God has (is) only one power, the power to ϕ is the same power as the power to ψ. We could simply call it P.
If God exercises P, then ϕ and ψ. There is no logically possible way for God to end up with just ϕ, because then God would only partially exercise P. But P is simple and has no parts. For God as a simple being, "ϕing" is the same as "ψing".
Hence, creation is completely necessary.
I don't see how you go from "God exercises the power to ϕ and ψ" to "ϕ and ψ". Is this a general thesis that if x exercises the power to ϕ and ψ, then ϕ and ψ?
Or is the thought that
1. if x exercises the power to ϕ and ψ, and only one eventuates, then x exercises the power only _partially_,
and that
2. partial exercise of a power is only possible for a being that has parts?
But neither (1) nor (2) seems clear to me.
Well, both are a logical consequence of a consistent use of divine simplicity, but I realize that, since you think God is three :), you do not use simplicity consistentl, so I understand why (1) and (2) don't seem clear to you.
So, we'll have to agree to disagree.
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