It is not possible for a creature to exercise complete control over another person’s (non-derivatively) free action.
If Molinism is true, it is possible for a creature to exercise complete control over another person’s (non-derivatively) free action.
So, Molinism is false.
For, if Molinism is true, there will be a possible situation where God reveals to Alice that if she were to make a request of Bob while wearing blue gloves, Bob would acquiesce to the request, but if she were to make the request while wearing red gloves, Bob would turn down the request. In such a case, by controlling which gloves she wears, Alice could exercise complete control over whether Bob acquiesces to the request.
Interestingly the same argument works against Thomism. For on Thomism, God can use primary causation to determine Bob to freely acquiesce in the request and God can use primary causation to determine Bob to freely refuse the request. God could then promise Alice that he would hear her prayers as to whether Bob agrees or refuses, and then with her prayers, Alice would have complete control over Bob's decision.
The argument doesn't work against mere foreknowledge views, open theist views or compatibilist views. On mere foreknowledge and open theism, the analogue of (2) is false, while on compatibilism, (1) is not plausible.
7 comments:
Alex,
It is true that if Alice prays Bob choose X, Bob does in fact choose X on the supposition that God has made the promise. Call this A->B for short (Alice prays entails Bob chooses X). Logically speaking however, B->A is also true in the same circumstances. Does this mean that Bob has complete control over Alice's choice? My intuitions say no.
It is tempting to think that while both A->B and B->A logically, only A->B describes what is going on causally. But if God is wholly responsible for the state of affairs, I don't think that is correct. In other words, God brings about [God promises, Alice prays, and Bob chooses X]. But there is no created causal pathway that justifies saying God brings about [God promises & Alice prays CAUSING Bob to choose X]. I think we can only say that Alice's prayer causes Bob to choose X on an account in which Alice has control over whether or not God makes Bob choose X. But on Thomism, she really doesn't.
One might think that this shows on Thomism prayer is not efficacious. However this isn't correct. If God chooses to actualize [God promises, Alice prays for Bob to choose X, and Bob chooses X], he does so in part because there are unique goods associated with Alice having her prayers answered (given divine omnirationality). But if God had simply actualized [Bob chooses X] those goods would not be instantiated.
The point of all this is that since God is wholly responsible for the events of this world, on Thomism, there is no reason to say that Alice is in complete control over Bob's decision, even in the scenario you describe.
What do you think?
Tom
That's very interesting. It makes for an occasionalism about the effects of our prayers, though.
I am also not sure that we can say that Alice praying for Bob to choose X explains Bob choosing X on this scenario. God wills Bob's choice partly because God wills Alice's prayer. But I don't think this means that God wills Bob's choice partly because of Alice's prayer (even if necessarily God wills Alice's prayer iff Alice prays).
I agree it makes for a kind of occasionalism about the effects of our prayers. I am not sure that this is a problem though for the Thomist. Maybe it is.
As to your second point, can't we say that God wills Bob's choice in part due to Alice's prayer since God has more reasons to cause [Alice prays and Bob choose X] than [Bob choose X]? To put it another way, in every world where Alice prays for Bob to choose X (i.e. God causes Alice to pray etc) God has greater motivation to cause Bob to choose X. In that sense, we can explain God's decision to cause Bob to choose X in part by Alice's choice to pray (or perhaps more accurately, by God's choice to cause Alice to pray, but then again, these might be one and the same event considered under two descriptions according to divine simplicity, I am not sure).
Granted, we can't explain Bob's decision to choose X with Alice's prayer in the sense that Bob's psychology/motivations etc are modified by Alice's prayer. But this can be solved if we wanted by adding an intermediate created cause which influences Bob's choice albeit does not determine it (e.g. grace).
(PS I think Matthews Grant has a book on his version of "libertarian" Thomism out this spring. Maybe he will address some of these issues)
First, God also has more reasons to cause [Alice prays and Bob choose X] than [Alice prays]. So if the one fact makes Bob's choice be in part due to Alice's prayer, the other makes Alice's prayer be in part due to Bob's choice. And that seems a vicious circularity.
Second, suppose I have two 3D printers and I am using the two to simultaneously print parts for a statue of Mary. Suppose I simultaneously hit the print button on both printers, one with the left hand and the other with the right hand.
One printer has white filament for the body and the other has gold filament for the halo. We can say things like:
- The halo is part of the design because the body is part of the design.
- Printer B is extruding the halo because I *planned* for printer A to extrude the body.
But we cannot say:
- Printer B is extruding the halo because printer A is extruding the body.
The explanatory connection is due to there being a common cause of printer B extruding the halo and printer A extruding the body. The common cause is the design.
Now suppose I have the final finished statue. It is tempting to say: "The halo exists because of the head." But that's not accurate. The correct thing to say is: "The halo exists because the design included a halo, and the design included a halo because the design included a head." Or, by an acceptable instance of transitivity: "The halo exists because the design included a head."
Similarly, on your proposal, the explanatory connection is between Bob's choice and God's idea about Alice's prayer, but not between Bob's choice and Alice's prayer.
I think exactly the same problem shows that Leibniz's account of intermonadic causation fails.
But there are two ways in which we can understand "God's idea about Alice's prayer."
If you mean God's decision to make Alice pray, then I agree. Bob's choice exists because of God's decision to create Bob's choice and his decision to create Bob's choice is explained (in part) by his decision to create Alice's prayer. Therefore,
(1) Bob's choice exists because of God's decision to create Alice in prayer.
The problem is that there is no such thing as God's decisions pertaining to creation over and above creation itself, if divine simplicity is true (at least according to how I read your understanding of the doctrine and according to what I take to be the most compelling version of the doctrine).
This means that if (1) is true, then so is
(2) Bob's choice exists because of Alice's prayer.
However, suppose by "God's idea" you mean something other than his decision but rather the actual world qua possible in the mind of God. Then you might say that Bob's choice exists because this particular possible world includes his choice and this particular possible world includes his choice because it includes Alice's prayer. Therefore,
(3) Bob's choice exists because this particular possible world includes Alice's prayer.
Both statements in the previous paragraph strike me as strange. It is odd to say that Bob's choice exists because there is a particular possible world in which his choice exists. This is only explanatory if we assume that God has in fact actualized that world. But in that case, we are utilizing the first explanatory chain, i.e. the one that gave us (1) and (2). It is also odd to say that a possible world includes Bob's choice because it includes Alice's prayer given that there is no necessary connection between the two and there are myriads of possible worlds with one or the other but not both.
So you could try to rescue this concept of "God's idea" but add the fact that his idea recognizes the inherent goods associated with Bob's choice, Alice's prayer, and the combination. In that case, we may say that Bob's choice exists because God recognizes the choice as good (i.e. his idea of the good includes Bob's choice), and he recognizes the choice as good because (in part) he recognizes Alice's prayer as good (i.e. God's idea of the good includes Alice's prayer). To put it another way, Bob's choice exists because it is good, Bob's choice is good in part because Alice's prayer is good and therefore,
(4) Bob's choice exists because Alice's prayer is good (in on other words, Bob's choice exists because God recognizes Alice's prayer is good).
But (4) is true on any account of divine providence and answered prayer. Therefore I do not see a problem explaining Bob's choice in this manner. You might think that (4) renders Alice's actual prayer unnecessary. But if Alice had not prayed, then we would not explain the goodness of Bob's choice with reference to her prayer. We would say Bob's choice is good for the independent reasons that it is good. In other words, it is only because God in fact decides to create Alice in prayer that we can explain Bob's choice with reference to Alice's prayer.
Going back to the statue analogy, I think it adds a step. When we speak of the "design" we are referencing your decision to make a certain statue. But in creation, there is no decision over and above the reality.
Maybe I am wrong in this entire line of reasoning. I am not a Thomist but I think the doctrine has its advantages. I appreciate the discussion
I agree that the proposition that God decided that Alice would pray is grounded in two propositions: (a) God exists and (b) Alice prays. But nonetheless the proposition that God decided that Alice would pray is a different proposition from the propositions that God exists and Alice prays or even their conjunction. And explanation pays attention to such distinctions between propositions.
Molinist here!
I disagree with (2), at least if "complete control" over Bob means that Alice could always make him acquiesce to her requests. It is metaphysically possible for Bob to make the same decision in every circumstance: "I will not acquiesce to Alice's request." And, if he did that, Alice would be unable to make him freely acquiesce to her request (i.e. would be unable to completely control Bob), due to his free will.
I know that this is one of those extreme Transworld-Depravity kind of counterexamples, but it's enough to undercut (2).
Have a nice day! :)
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