Why did Alice make this lectern?

Converse essentiality of qualitative origins holds that if possible objects x and y have the same qualitative causal history—i.e., their initial state is qualitatively the same and the causes of that are qualitatively the same, etc.—then x = y. Kripke’s lectern argument basically makes it plausible to think that if converse essentiality of qualitative origins holds, so does essentiality of origins—the thesis that an object couldn’t have had a different qualitative causal history than it did.

If we reject converse essentiality of origins, then we have a thorny explanatory problem: When Alice took piece of wood W and shaped it into a lectern with shape S, what explains why lectern L₁ rather than, say, lectern L₂ resulted?

One way out of this explanatory problem is a partial occasionalism: Whenever an object comes into existence, while creatures may decide what the qualities of the object are, God causes the specific haecceity.

Another way out is to replace converse essentiality of qualitative origins with a converse essentiality of full origins thesis: if possible objects have the qualitatively and numerically (apart possibly from their own identity) causal history, then they are the same. Then when Alice takes W and shapes it into a lectern with shape S, only L₁ (say) can result. But if Alice’s identical twin Barbara did it, it would have been (say) L₂.

We thus seem to have three options as to the explanation of why Alice produced L₁ rather than L₂.

1. converse essentiality of qualitative origins

2. converse essentiality of full origins

3. partially occasionalistic haecceitism.

Maybe there are other good ones.