The A-theory and a countably infinite fair lottery

Let’s suppose that the universe has a beginning and the tensed theory of propositions (which is accepted by most A-theorists) is true. Then consider for each n the proposition d_n that n days have elapsed from the beginning of the universe. This proposition is contingent on a tensed theory of propositions. Exactly one of the propositions d_n is true. No one of the propositions d_n is more likely to be true than any other. So, it seems, we have a countably infinite fair lottery. But such are, arguably, impossible. See Chapter 4 of my infinity book. (E.g., it’s fun to note that on the tensed theory of time we should be incredibly surprised that it’s only 13 billion years since the beginning of the universe.)

Since the universe does have a beginning (and even if it does not, we can still run the argument relative to some other event than the beginning of the universe), it seems we should reject the tensed theory of propositions.