Also how does memory theory of identity deal with the question that which of my memories are identical to me? Intuitively I won't get annihilated by losing many of my memories.
1. I am myself (literally, my self). 2. My self is my first person subject, my first person experience, unified and persisting. 3. If I lost memories I would still have 2. 4. Therefore the memory theory of identity is false regardless if what comes out of my mother is me or merely a part of me.
But I worry....Graham Priest says humans are obviously wholes (where my mother gives birth to me), but I want to say, like Dustin Crummett, that persons are simples (my mother gives birth to my body which contains me).
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Also how does memory theory of identity deal with the question that which of my memories are identical to me? Intuitively I won't get annihilated by losing many of my memories.
The usual formulation is that a single memory is enough to secure identity.
1. I am myself (literally, my self).
2. My self is my first person subject, my first person experience, unified and persisting.
3. If I lost memories I would still have 2.
4. Therefore the memory theory of identity is false regardless if what comes out of my mother is me or merely a part of me.
But I worry....Graham Priest says humans are obviously wholes (where my mother gives birth to me), but I want to say, like Dustin Crummett, that persons are simples (my mother gives birth to my body which contains me).
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