People often levy an arbitrariness objection against divine command theory:
- If God simply chooses what we ought, why did he choose to command kindness rather than cruelty?
It occurs to me that an advocate of theistic natural law probably cannot levy the arbitrariness object. For there is a structurally very similar question about theistic natural law:
- If God simply chooses which natures to create, why did he choose to create beings with our basic physical structure and a nature that requires kindness rather than beings with our basic physical structure but a nature that requires cruelty?
It might be retorted that logical space does not contain a nature that specifies cruelty and yet the same basic physical structure as ours. This is plausible to me, but the main reason to doubt that there could be such a nature is some theistic story such as that all natures are ways of imitating God, and it is incompatible with divine goodness that he be imitable in such a cruel way. And this, in turn, is quite parallel to the standard divine command response to (1), that it is incompatible with divine goodness that he command cruelty to beings like us.
I think theistic natural law does have advantages over divine command theory. But a better resolution to the arbitrariness objection does not seem to be one of these advantages.
19 comments:
Could it be argued that the arbitrariness objection also applies to some non-theistic metaethical theories?
The main problem is that, whichever theory one chooses, the bottom line is always that morality has a kind of necessity independent of whether God exists or not.
The claim that "God cannot be cruel" e.g. requires there is a independent standard of goodness that apples to everyone, including God.
Walter:
I agree that there needs to be an independent standard of good. But an independent standard of the good need not imply an independent standard of ought.
Alex
If an independent standard of good does not imply an independent standard of ought, there can be no standard of ought. "Ought" is, for me, another way of saying "is good (for me)". I don't see how any other "ought" makes any sense at all.
"I think theistic natural law does have advantages over divine command theory."
I'd be curious to hear what you think the main advantages are (if they can be briefly stated).
Walter,
What do you mean by an independent standard of good (independent of God, that is)? Do you mean metaphysically independent or epistemically independent (i.e. we can know something is good without knowing about God)? I agree with the latter, but why think we need a metaphysically independent standard of good? It's false that we always need a metaphysically independent standard of good, since this would lead to an infinite regress. So all theories need to posit some fundamental standard of goodness, relative to which there are no metaphysically independent standards of goodness.
Mikhail
You should ask Alex, because he agrees with me that there needs to be an independent standard of good and he is a professional philosopher.
But I'll give you my two cents. This standard, if it exists, is a metaphysical standard, not merely an epistemic one, and it would look something like "X is good". This means that something is good (or bad) regardless of who does it. I don't see why this would lead to an infinite regress, because it simply is the fundamental standard of goodness.
This standard cannot be God, since it is not true that God can make something good that is fundamentally bad.
If raping a child, e.g. is necessarily bad, then it is impossible for God to command it.
Walter,
You write: "This standard cannot be God, since it is not true that God can make something good that is fundamentally bad."
But this point applies to whatever the fundamental standard of goodness is - whatever that standard is, it cannot make something fundamentally bad into something good. Call that standard X - if raping a child is necessarily bad, then it is impossible for X to make it good. But that doesn't mean X isn't the fundamental standard of goodness.
Mikhail
If raping a child is necessarily bad, then the necessity of this being bad is the standard.
In that case, there can be no other standard called X.
Walter,
But that standard can't make what's bad good and vice versa either, so on your reasoning, it can't be the standard.
Mikhail
You misunderstand my reasoning. A standard doesn't have to make something bad good. The reason God cannot be the standard is because He is subject to this standard. He cannot make the bad good because the bad is necessarily bad. It's impossible to alter this standard.
Walter,
You write: "The reason God cannot be the standard is because He is subject to this standard."
This is question-begging, and more importantly, I could always posit another standard and say your standard is subject to my standard. The positing of standards needs to stop somewhere.
You're right that the bad is necessarily bad, but that doesn't rule out God being the standard because we can explain this necessary badness with God's necessary existence and goodness. That is, the reason the bad is necessarily bad is because God exists necessarily, and God is essentially good.
Mikhail
No, it's no question-begging and you cannot posit another standard, because this neecssary standard is the stopping point.
God's being necessarily good entails that God being evil would be a contradiction. But God being evil can only be contradictory if there is an independent standard of goodness. If there is no independent standard that says that rape is evil e.g., then there is no contradiction in God condoning rape.
Hence there is a possible world in which God condones rape.
Walter
You write, "If there is no independent standard that says that rape is evil e.g., then there is no contradiction in God condoning rape."
Why think that? There's a contradiction in God condoning rape because rape is necessary evil and rape is necessarily evil because it goes against God's essentially good nature. No need for an independent standard here.
I think this conversation has ceased to make progress.
Mikhail
I agree with Alex that this conversation doesn't seem to make progress, so I think it's time that we agree to disagree.
Walter:
God could not have a different nature than He actually has. The nature He actually has is what we call "good". Therefore, God could not be evil. I really don't understand where the need for an external standard is. And it seems as absurd to say that duty is reducible to good as to say that colors are reducible to sounds. Giving everything I have to the poor is something I consider good, but is it a duty for me?
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