Tuesday, November 23, 2021

Failures of supervenience on Lewis's system

Start with the concept of “narrowly physical” for facts about the arrangement of physical entities and first-order physical properties such as “charge” and “mass”.

Here are two observations I have not seen made:

  1. On Lewis-Ramsey accounts of laws, laws of nature concerning narrowly physical facts do not supervene on narrowly physical facts.

  2. On Lewis’s account of causation, causal facts about narrowly physical events do not supervene on narrowly physical facts.

This means that in a Lewisian system we have at least four things we could mean by “physical”:

  1. narrowly physical

  2. grounded in the laws of narrowly physical facts and/or the narrowly physical facts themselves

  3. grounded in the causal facts about narrowly physical events and/or the narrowly physical facts themeselves

  4. grounded in the causal facts about narrowly physical events, the laws concerning narrowly physical facts and/or the narrowly physical facts themselves.

Here’s a corollary for the philosophy of mind:

  1. On a Lewisian system, we should not even expect the mental properties of purely narrowly physical beings to supervene on narrowly physical facts.

Argument for (1): The laws are the optimal systematization of particular facts. But now imagine a possible world where there is just a coin that is tossed a trillion times, and with no discernible pattern lands heads about half the time. In the best systematization, we attribute a chance of 1/2 to the coin landing heads. But now imagine a possible world with the same narrowly physical facts, but where there is an angel that thought about ℵ3 about a million times—each time, with a good prior mental explanation of the train of thought—and each of these times was a time just before the coin landed heads. Then the best systematization of the coin tosses will no longer make them simply have a chance of 1/2 of landing heads. Rather, they will have a chance 1/2 of landing heads when the angel didn’t just think about ℵ3.

Argument for (2): Add to the world in the above argument some cats and suppose that on any day when the fattest cat in the world eats n mice, that leads the angel to think about ℵn, though there are other things that can get the angel to think about ℵn. We can set things up so that the fattest cat’s eating three mice in a day causes the coin to land heads on the Lewisian counterfactual account of causation, but if we subtract the angel from the story, this will no longer be the case.

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