If I intend for an event to happen, I had better intend for my action to raise the chance of the event happening. And most of the time I raise the chance of an event happening precisely in order that the event happen.
But I can also intend to raise the chance of an event happening without intending the event to happen. Thus, when testing one’s product, one uses the product in more extreme ways that deliberately raise the chance of failure. But one isn’t intending failure. One raises the probability of failure with the hope that despite the raised chance, the product does not fail.
2 comments:
If sufficiently high credences are sufficient for belief, this would also be an interesting counterexample to the view that believing you will x is sufficient for intending to x.
The same can be said for a scientist who, committed to the truth of a hypothesis, attempts to experimentally falsify the hypothesis. This, I think, shows a connection between product testing and the scientific method.
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