This argument is fairly well trodden, but I still have to say that I find it quite compelling:
If physicalism is true, then there was no sharp time at which I came into existence.
There was a sharp time at which I came into existence.
So, physicalism is false.
Why think (1) is true? Well, if physicalism is true, there is nothing more to me than an arrangement of particles. And which exact arrangements count as sufficient for my existence seems quite vague. And why think (2) is true? Well, if there is no sharp time at which I came into existence, then there will be worlds where it is vague whether I ever exist at all. For instance, if it is vague whether I already existed by time t1, then imagine a world just like ours up to t1, but where immediately thereafter everything is annihilated. If it is vague whether I existed by time t1 in our world, then it that world it will be vague whether I ever exist. But it can’t be vague whether I ever exist—vague existence is an impossibility.
Objection 1: There are many entities very much like me, each of which comes into existence at a sharp time, sharing most of their particles, and I am one of them. None of these entities is privileged, but as it happens I am only one of them. The entities differ in fine details of persistence and existence conditions.
Response: If none are privileged, then all these entities are persons. And so in my armchair there are many persons, and likewise wherever any human being is, there are many persons. Now, notice that there is more room for such “slight variation” when an individual is physically larger (i.e., has more particles). So it follows from the view that where there is a larger person, there are more persons. All the persons co-located with me have presumably the same experiences and the same rights (since none are privileged). So it follows that if you have a choice between benefiting a larger and a smaller person, you should benefit the larger. This sizeism is clearly absurd.
Objection 2: A Markosian-style view on which there are brute facts about composition can say that there is only entity where I am, and the other clouds of particles do not compose an entity.
Response: Yes, but while that counts as materialism, it doesn’t count as physicalism. It adds to the fundamental ontology something beyond what physical science talks about, namely entities that are brutely composed. Moreover, presumably persons are causes. So the story adds to physicalism additional causes.
Objection 3: Nobody can say that there was a sharp time at which I came into existence.
Response: It’s easy for the dualist to say it. I come into existence when my soul comes into existence, joined to some bit of matter. There is no vagueness as to when this happens, but of course the details are not empirically knowable.
5 comments:
Alex
"Well, if physicalism is true, there is nothing more to me than an arrangement of particles. And which exact arrangements count as sufficient for my existence seems quite vague."
It seems quite vague. But is it really vague, or does it seem vague because currently, we cannot detect the exact arrangenemts of particles that count as suffiicient for my existence?
Walter,
"You" (or just as well "I" or "me", it seems we are all in the same boat in this regard) is vague.
That is, there is no single precise arrangement of material that counts as the "I".
Consider what just happened to you in the last minute. Little bits of you went flying off into the atmosphere or deposited elsewhere, never to return. Some of your cells died, so even though the material of those cells might still be in the boundary you consider "I", the arrangement of the material in those cells changes.
Yet you still call yourself Walter. You still identify as "I".
On materialism the apparent continuity of self is easy to account for by ranges, sets, and renormalization.
From moment to moment the "I" of each of us changes, but it changes within a small range, small relative to subjective limits engrained in our sensibilities, our brain processes.
The set of "I" is thus redefined, or, renormalized, moment to moment, continually, for our entire lives.
Every little change is the new "me", so the next small change is again the new "me".
All very vague. So I accept premise 1 of the OP.
" (2) is true? Well, if there is no sharp time at which I came into existence, then there will be worlds where it is vague whether I ever exist at all."
Logical worlds don't matter ontologically.
There is only 1 real ontologically existent world.
Your abstractions of imagined logically possible worlds are irrelevant.
"But it can’t be vague whether I ever exist—vague existence is an impossibility."
You are conflating existential realization with your abstractions.
You have committed the fallacy of reification, among other confusions in your reasoning.
Material exists.
Arrangements of material do not exist.
Those statements are coherent on a consistent application of the meaning of "exist".
To "exist" in this sense is to have ontological realization in the cosmos.
I agree, the materials of the cosmos exist unambiguously. It is a matter of objective fact that the materials that exist do in fact exist, and other imagined materials that are not factually realized in the cosmos as a matter of objective fact do not exist.
I agree, there is no such thing as material that has intrinsic to itself some sort of vagueness to its existential realization.
I agree that arrangements are the factual state of affairs in the cosmos. The particular arrangements of material in the cosmos at any moment are factually the arrangements that they are as a matter of objective fact, irrespective of whether any person can precisely describe that objective fact of the state of affairs of the cosmos.
I agree, there is no such thing as an intrinsically vague state of affairs in the cosmos at any particular moment.
Your error, Alex (I think people are on a first name basis here by custom, apologies if the is not the case), is in the reification of your abstraction of "I".
"I" is just your definition, and is inherently vague.
The expression "I exist" is inherently vague because "I" is inherently vague.
There are many arrangements of material that you would consider to be "I".
Let's take a closer look at your statement.
" But it can’t be vague whether I ever exist"
Here you assert that it can't be vague that something inherently vague can exist vaguely. Thus, you are contradicting yourself already.
"—vague existence is an impossibility."
Here you have blended reification of your vague abstraction of "I" while confusing or conflating ontological existence of material with your vague definition of some set of states of affairs in the cosmos you vaguely class as "I".
If you you state "I XYZ" and "I" is vague then the statement "I XYZ" is vague.
If there is a range of time during which it is humanly indeterminate as to whether set X is an "I" and then during that time all the material in set X is dissociated from set X, then it is humanly indeterminate as to whether set X was or was not an "I".
This also seems to be an argument against the soul having parts.
I don't see why it's an argument against the soul having parts. On a dualist view, the soul could be a fundamental entity that is prior to its parts, and it is the beginning and end (if any) of this fundamental entity that determines our beginning and end (if any). The physicalist, at least as I understand physicalism, cannot make that move, because on physicalism it is the fundamental entities of physics that are the fundamental entities simpliciter, and no fundamental entity of physics is a plausible candidate for being necessary and sufficient for a person's existence.
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