There are four main families of views of who we are:
Bodies (or organisms)
Brains (or at least cerebra)
Body-soul composites
Souls.
For the sake of filling out logical space, and maybe getting some insight, it’s worth thinking a bit about what other options there might be. Here is one that occurred to me:
- Brain-soul (or cerebrum-soul) composites.
I suppose the reason this is not much (if at all) talked about is that if one believes in a soul, the body-soul composite or soul-only views seem more natural. Why might one accept a brain-soul composite view? (For simplicity, I won’t worry about the brain-cerebrum distinction.)
Here is one line of thought. Suppose we accept some of the standard arguments for dualism, such as that matter can’t be conscious or that matter cannot think abstract thoughts. This leads us to think the mind cannot be entirely material. But at the same time, there is some reason to think the mind is at least partly material: the brain’s activity sure seems like an integral part of our discoursive thought. Thus, the dualist might have reason to say that the mind is a brain-soul composite. At the same time, there is a Cartesian line of thought that we should be identified with the minimal entity hosting our thoughts, namely the mind. Putting all these lines of thought together, we conclude that we are minds, and hence brain-soul composites.
Now I don’t endorse (5). The main ethical arguments against (2) and (4), namely that they don’t do justice to the deep ethical significance of the human body, apply against (5) as well. But if one is not impressed by these arguments, there really is some reason to accept (5).
Furthermore, exploring new options, like the brain-soul composite option, sometimes may give new insights into old options. I am now pretty much convinced that the mind is something like the brain plus soul (or maybe cerebrum plus intellectual part of soul or some other similar combination). Since it is extremely plausible that all of my mind is a part of me, this gives me a new reason to reject (4), the view that I am just a soul. At the same time, I do not think it is necessary to hold that I am just a mind, so I can continue to accept view (3).
The view that the mind is the brain plus soul has an interesting consequence for the interim state, the state of the human being between death and the resurrection of the body. I previously thought that the human being in the interim state is in an unfortunately amputated state, having lost all of the body. But if we see the brain as a part of the mind, the amputated nature of the human being in the interim state is even more vivid: a part of the human mind is missing in the interim state. This gives a better explanation of why Paul was right to insist on the importance of the physical resurrection—we cannot be fully in our mind without at least some of our physical components.
6 comments:
Here is an alternative which has been on my mind. I am an immaterial soul/mind with material parts. In other words, I am a whole composed of material parts, but the whole qua whole is an immaterial soul/mind. (Of course, this view is extremely counterintuitive, for we instinctively hold that, if the xs are parts of y, and the xs are material, then y is material. And this view rejects this assumption.)
Mike, what is the motivation for that alternative?
I am not sure the view is adequately motivated, but here is a quick sketch of a line of thought.
(1) Assuming libertarian free will and composition is not identity, I cannot make a free decision if my decisions are determined by my parts. My mind, therefore, cannot be a part of me. It is best, therefore, to think I am identical with my mind.
(2) Certain mental activities cannot be material processes. Therefore, my mind is immaterial.
(3) I am composed of material parts.
The account sketched above allows me hold (1)-(3) together.
Michael:
I think Brandon Rickabaugh may have a similar view.
I would tweak your argument against this view. I don't think it's true that something with a material part is a material thing. Imagine a committee made up of yourself and a dozen angels. That committee doesn't seem to be a material thing even though it has a material part (your body). I would be inclined to make a weaker claim that is sufficient for arguing against the view: An immaterial object has no material parts. Of course it kind of begs the question against the view, but it is also a really, really plausible claim.
I would distinguish three kinds of beings: immaterial beings, material beings, and beings that are partly material and partly immaterial, like that committee of thirteen that I mention in the previous paragraph. (To be honest, I am inclined to think there are no material substances--all substances have form, and form is not material.)
I wonder, though, if this isn't largely a verbal question about what "material" means.
The view that I am a brain-body-soul composite—would there be any relevant difference between that view and these others?
I assume by "body" you mean body-minus-brain. I am thinking that once you have brain and body-minus-brain, then you basically have body, so the brain-body-soul composite is just a body-soul composite (in the usual sense of "body" that does include a brain).
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