If it can be reasonable for a typical innocent human being to save lions from extinction at the expense of the human’s own life, then the life of a typical human being is not of greater value than that of all the lion species.
It can be reasonable for a typical innocent human being to save lions from extinction at the expense of the human’s own life.
So, the life of a typical innocent human being is not of greater value than that of the lion species.
It is wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being in order to save tigers, elephants and giraffes from extinction.
It is not wrong to intentionally destroy the lion species in order to save tigers, elephants and giraffes from extinction.
If (3), (4) and (5), then the right to life of innocent human beings is not grounded in how great the value of human life is.
So, the right to life of innocent human beings is not grounded in how great the value of human life is.
I think the conclusion to draw from this is the Kantian one, that dignity that property of human beings that grounds respect, is not a form of value. A human being has a dignity greater than that of all lions taken together, as indicated by the deontological claims (4) and (5), but a human being does not have a value greater than that of all lions taken together.
One might be unconvinced by (2). But if so, then tweak the argument. It is reasonable to accept a 25% chance of death in order to stop an alien attack aimed at killing off all the lions. If so, then on the plausible assumption that the value of all the lions, tigers, elephants and giraffes is at least four times that of the lions (note that there are multiple species of elephants and giraffes, but only one of lions), it is reasonable to accept a 100% chance of death in order to stop the alien attack aimed at killing off all four types of animals. But now we can easily imagine sixteen types of animals such that it is permissible to intentionally kill off the lions, tigers, elephants and giraffes in order to save the 16 types, but it is not permissible to intentionally kill a human in order to save the 16 types.
2 comments:
I’m confident that the conclusion (7) is true. I’m less confident that (5) is true. The easiest way to defend (5) would be to assume that the value of non-human organisms is grounded in how great their value is. But I think there is at least some reason to doubt this. Compare two situations:
Situation 1: In order for you to gain $150, you need to abandon $100. In this case, it would be true to say that you have lost nothing; rather, you have gained $50. And it would be very silly of you to be the least bit sad about the ‘loss’ of $100.
Situation 2: In order for three new beautiful species of birds to evolve, one old beautiful species of birds needs to die off. In this case, it would be true to say that something genuine has been lost in the world—namely, the old beautiful species of birds. And if there were a rational agent observing the process, it would be entirely appropriate to be sad about the loss. It would be appropriate to be sad about this loss even though it could also be appropriate to prefer a world where the old beautiful birds go extinct to one where they don’t.
In many cases, I might say (speaking loosely) that the three new bird species are ‘worth more’ than the one old bird species. But I consider this to be a useful shorthand for talking about the ranking of preferences. It isn’t really true that the inner worth of substances are quantified according to units of value.
In today's society the concepts of 'worth' and 'value' are so tied into our everyday thinking we can scarcely conceive of a world without them. But that, surely, is an error.
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