Ted Sider famously argues for the universality of composition on the grounds that:
If composition is not universal, then one can find a continuous series of cases from a case of no composition to a case of composition.
Given such a continuous series, there won’t be any abrupt cut-off in composition.
But composition is never vague, so there would have to be an abrupt cut-off.
Consider this argument that every velocity is an escape velocity:
If it’s not the case that every velocity is an escape velocity from a spherically symmetric body of some fixed size and mass, then one can find a continuous series of cases from a case of insufficiency to escape to a case of sufficiency to escape.
Given such a continuous series, there won’t be any abrupt cut-off in escape velocity.
But escape velocity is never vague, so there would have to be an abrupt cut-off.
It’s obvious that we should deny (5). There is an abrupt cut-off in escape velocity, and there is a precise formula for what it is: (2GM/r)1/2 where G is the gravitational constant, M is the mass of the spherical body, and r is its radius. As the velocity of a projectile gets closer and closer to the (2GM/r)1/2, the projectile goes further and further before turning back. When the velocity reaches (2GM/r)1/2, the projectile goes out forever. There is no paradox here.
Why think that composition is different from escape velocity? Why not think that just as the laws of nature precisely specify when the projectile can escape gravity, they also precisely specify when a bunch of objects compose a whole?
My suspicion is that the reason for thinking the two are different is thinking that composition is something like a “logical” or maybe “metaphysical” matter, while escape is a “causal” matter. Now, universalists like David Lewis do tend to think that the whole is a free lunch, nothing but the “sum of the parts”, in which case it makes sense to think that composition is not something for the laws of nature to specify. But if we are not universalists, then it seems to me that it is very natural to think of composition in a causal way: when a proper plurality of xs are arranged a certain way, they cause the existence of a new entity y that stands in a composed-by relation to the xs, just as when a projectile has a certain velocity, that causes the projectile to escape to infinity.
Some may be bothered by the fact that laws of nature are often taken to be contingent, and so there would be a world with the same parts as ours but different wholes. That would bother one if one thinks that wholes are a free lunch. But if we take wholes seriously, it should no more bother us than a world where particles behave the same way up to time t1, and then behave differently after t1 because the laws are different.
Humeans have good reason to reject the above view, though. If the laws of composition are to match our intuitions about composition, they are likely to be extremely complex, and perhaps too complex to be part of the best system defining the laws on a Humean account of laws. But if we are not Humeans about laws, and think the simplicity of laws is merely an epistemic virtue, the explanatory power of laws of composition might make it reasonable to accept very complex such laws.
That said, we all have reject the simple causal version of the above view, where a proper plurality composing a whole causes the whole’s existence. For instance, I am composed by a plurality of parts that includes my hair, but my hair is not a cause of my existence: I would have just as much existed had I never developed hair. So a more complex version of the causal view is needed: initial parts (maybe the DNA in the zygote that I started as) causally contribute to the existence of the whole, but the causal relation runs in a different direction with respect to later parts, like teeth: perhaps I and my teeth together cause the teeth to be parts of me.
(I don’t endorse the more complex causal view either. I prefer, but still do not endorse, an Aristotelian alternative: when y is in a certain condition, it causes the existence of all of the parts. This is much neater because the causation always runs in the same direction.)
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