In some video games, it feels like I am doing the in-game character’s actions and in others it feels like I am playing a character that does the actions. The distinction does not map onto the distinction between first-person-view and third-person-view. In a first-person view game, even a virtual reality one (I’ve been playing Asgard Wrath 2 on my Quest 2 headset), it can still feel like a character is doing the action, even if visually I see things from the character’s point of view. On the other hand, one can have a cartoonish third-person-view game where it feels like I am doing the character’s actions—for instance, Wii Sports tennis. (And, of course, there are games which have no in-game character responsible for the actions, such as chess or various puzzle games like Vexed. But my focus is on games where there is something like an in-game character.)
For those who don’t play video games, note that one can watch a first-person-view movie like Lady in the Lake without significantly identifying with the character whose point of view is presented by the camera. And sometimes there is a similar distinction in dreams, between events happening to one and events happening to an in-dream character from whose point of view one looks at things. (And, reversely, in real life some people suffer from a depersonalization where feels like the events of life are happening to a different person.)
Is there anything philosophically interesting that we can say about the felt distinction between seeing something from someone else’s point of view—even in a highly immersive and first-person way as in virtual reality—and seeing it as happening to oneself? I am not sure. I find myself feeling like things are happening to me more in games with a significant component of physical exertion (Wii Sports tennis, VR Thrill of the Fight boxing) and where the player character doesn’t have much character to them, so it is easier to embody them, and less so in games with a significant narrative where the player character has character of their own—even when it is pretty compelling, as in Deus Ex. Maybe both the physical aspect and the character aspect are bound up in a single feature—control. In games with a significant physical component, there is more physical control. And in games where there is a well-developed player character, presumably to a large extent this is because the character’s character is the character’s own and only slightly under one’s control (e.g., maybe one can control fairly coarse-grained features, roughly corresponding to alignment in D&D).
If this is right, then a goodly chunk of the “it’s happening to me” feeling comes not from the quality of the sensory inputs—one can still have that feeling when the inputs are less realistic and lack it when they are more realistic—but from control. This is not very surprising. But if it is true, it might have some philosophical implications outside of games and fiction. It might suggest that self-consciousness is more closely tied to agency than is immediately obvious—that self-consciousness is not just a matter of a sequence of qualia. (Though, I suppose, someone could suggest that the feeling of self-conscious is just yet another quale, albeit one that typically causally depends on agency.)
1 comment:
Dear Alexander Pruss,
While reading your post, I realized there is a topic not widely discussed in free will analysis (at least to my knowledge) that I find particularly interesting. You noted the important relationship between our operating capacity and our perception of consciousness, and you also mentioned the case of depersonalization.
Having researched this topic quite a bit, it is fascinating that people experiencing this form of dissociation often do not feel their bodies—feeling somewhat detached from their consciousness and agency—yet they still think and, even more strongly, know that their actions are free and their own. Thus, although they do not experience free will as a bodily sensation, they maintain the rational conviction that they are the authors of their actions.
This suggests it might be possible for a rational being to feel completely determined at a somatic level, yet still know (and be) free. While counterintuitive, this makes sense if we view free will as a faculty of our immaterial soul.
A speculative explanation would be that, just as brain damage can affect the relationship between soul and body (assuming a hylomorphic view, while distinguishing the faculties of different aspects), certain conditions like depersonalization might cause a temporary disruption in the interface between our faculty of free will and our bodily perception of it.
If this dichotomy between feeling free and being free holds, it seems to pose a challenge for certain popular versions of compatibilism that rely heavily on the phenomenological 'feeling' of agency. If the subjective sensation of freedom can be detached from the rational conviction or reality of free choice, then the phenomenology of freedom may be far less central to the debate than is often assumed.
I am very interested in these types of dissociative phenomena and would love to hear your thoughts on whether such psychologically altered states can offer valuable insights into consciousness and free will.
Best regards,
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