Causal finitism/countabilism and 4D unrestricted composition

Assume four dimensional unrestricted composition (or mereological universalism). Plausibly, there is a world where on Monday there are infinitely many things, and on Tuesday Alice and Bob cause a sofa to go into the living room.

Also plausibly:

1. If x and y cause z at t, then anything composed of x and y at t causes z at t.

Why? Well, anything composed of x and y at t has the causal powers of x and y at t, and these causal powers are activated, and their activation results in z, so it seems that anything so composed causes z.

But on Monday there were infinitely many things. Thus, by four dimensional unrestricted composition, there are infinitely many things composed on Monday of some of the infinitely many things that exist on Monday and composed on Tuesday of Alice and Bob. By (1), each of these things is the cause of the sofa’s entry into the living room.

Thus, infinitely many things are the cause of the sofa’s entry into the living room. This violates causal finitism. Hence we have an argument from causal finitism against 4D unrestricted composition.

In fact, we have an argument from causal countabilism against 4D unrestricted composition, since there are uncountably many things composed on Monday of the infinitely many things that exist then and composed on Tuesday of Alice and Bob.