Supererogation and breakfast

Consider this plausible definition:

1. An action is supererogatory provided that it is good but not obligatory.

Now add this thesis:

2. We have no obligations to ourselves.

It now follows that we’re constantly doing supererogatory stuff. For instance, I just refrained from deliberately painfully burning my finger with a match. My refraining was good. But if I have no obligation to myself, it wasn’t obligatory. Hence, my refraining was supererogatory. This does not seem to be a plausible consequence.

Given the plausibility of (1), this yields some reason to deny (2). Painfully burning my finger with a match violates my obligations to myself.

But there may be other problems with (1) where allowing obligations to self will not solve the problem. I had breakfast this morning, which was good, but even if I do have obligations to self, having breakfast doesn’t seem to be one of them.

Perhaps, though, the breakfast case isn’t so damaging. The supererogation literature talks of very minor supererogatory acts, such as minor acts of politeness. Perhaps having breakfast is just one of the very minor supererogatory acts. If so, then we can save (1), as long as we reject (2) and allow for obligations to self.

The other move is to redefine (1) in a way that excludes benefits to self:

2. An action is supererogatory provided that it is good, and not just for oneself, but not obligatory.