Classical theism holds that God is timeless and knows all objective truths. According to A-theories of time, objective truths change (e.g., what exists simpliciter changes on presentism, and on other A-theories at least what time is objectively present changes). There is a prima facie conflict here, which leads some classical theists to reject the A-theory of time.
But there is also a widely accepted reply. Classical theism also holds that God is simple. One of the consequences of divine simplicity is that if God had created a different world, he wouldn’t have been any different intrinsically—and yet he would know something different, namely that he created that world rather than this one. Seemingly the only good solution to this problem is to suppose that God’s knowledge is in part extrinsically constituted—that facts about what God knows about contingent things are partly constituted by these contingent things.
But the same move seems to save timelessness and the A-theory. For if God’s knowledge is partly extrinsically constituted, then as the created world objectively changes, as the A-theory holds, God’s knowledge can change without any intrinsic change in God. Basically, the change of God’s knowledge is only a Cambridge change in God—a purely relational change.
I have always been pulled two ways here. Since I accepted divine simplicity, the response seemed right. But it also seemed right to think there is a tension between God’s timelessness and the A-theory of time, thereby yielding an argument against the A-theory.
I haven’t settled this entirely to my satisfaction, but I now think there may well be an argument from classical theism against the A-theory.
First, note that the extrinsic constitution move is aimed not specifically at a tension between God’s timelessness and the A-theory, but at a tension between God’s immutability and the A-theory. The move shows how an immutable being could have changing knowledge, because of extrinsic constitution. But while any timeless being is immutable, the other implication need not hold: timelessness is a stronger condition than immutability, and hence there could be a tension between divine timelessness and the A-theory even if there isn’t a tension between immutability and the A-theory.
Here is why I see a tension. The crucial concept here is of a merely relational change, a Cambridge change. The most common example of a Cambridge change is something like:
- Bob became shorter than his daughter Alice.
Here, we’re not supposed to think that Bob changed intrinsically, but simply that Alice got taller!
But there is another kind of change that I used to lump in with (1):
- Dinosaurs became beloved of children around the world.
Both are, I suppose, Cambridge changes. But they are crucially different. The difference comes from the fact that in (1), the change is between the slightly younger Bob being taller than Alice was then and the slightly older bob being sorter than Alice was then. While the change was due to Alice’s growth, rather than Bob’s shrinkage, nonetheless it is crucial to this kind of Cambridge change that we be comparing the subject at t1, considered relationally, with the subject at t2, again considered relationally. It is, say, the 2018 Bob who is taller than Alice, while it is the 2023 Bob who is shorter than Alice. I will call this kind of thing strong Cambridge change.
But when dinosaurs become beloved of children around the world, as they did over the course of the 20th century, this wasn’t a change between earlier and later dinosaurs. Indeed, the dinosaurs were no longer around when this Cambridge change happened. I will call this kind of thing weak Cambridge change.
Strong Cambridge change requires an object to at least persist through time: to be one way (relationally) at one time and another way (again, relationally) at another. Weak Cambridge change does not require even that. One can have weak Cambridge change of an object that exists only for an instant (think of an instantaneous event that becomes notorious).
A timeless being can “undergo” weak Cambridge change, but not strong Cambridge change. And I suspect that change in knowledge, even when the knowledge is extrinsically constituted, is strong Cambridge change.
Here is a piece of evidence for this thesis. Knowledge for us is partly extrinsically constituted—if only because (I am grateful to Christopher Tomaszewski for this decisive point) what we know has to be true, and truths is typically extrinsic to us! But now suppose that I have a case where the only thing lacking to knowledge is truth—I have a belief that is justified in the right way, but it just happens not to be true. Now suppose that at noon the thing I believe comes to be true (here we are assuming the A-theory). If we set up the case right, I come to know the thing at noon, though the change is a strong Cambridge change. But suppose that at noon I also cease to exist. Then I don’t come to know the thing! To come to know something, I would have to persist from not knowing to knowing. Prior to noon I was such that if the thing were true, I’d know it, but the thing isn’t true. After noon, I don’t know the thing, even though it isn’t true, because I don’t exist after noon. Change in extrinsically constituted knowledge seems to be at least strong Cambridge change.
Further, think about this. When God knows p in one world and not-p in another, this transworld difference is a difference between how God is in the one world and how God is in the other world, even if it is a relational difference. Similarly, we would expect that if God changes from knowing p at t1 to knowing not-p at t2, God exists t1 and also at t2. And this does not seem to fit with God’s timelessness. (But don’t classical theists say God is omnipresent, and shouldn’t that include omnitemporal presence? Yes, but omnitemporal presence is not omnitemporal existence.)
In other words, I think for God to change in knowledge in lockstep with the objective facts changing, God has to exist in lockstep with these objective facts. To change from knowing to not knowing some fact due to the change in these facts, one needs to be a contemporary of these changing facts. And a timeless being is not (except should there be an Incarnation) a contemporary of anything.
In summary: A timeless being can only undergo weak Cambridge change, while it is strong Cambridge change that would be needed to maintain knowledge through a change in objective truths, even if that change is extrinsically constituted. One can uphold the A-theory with a changeless God, but not, I think, a timeless God.
Or so I suspect, but I am far from sure, because the distinction between weak and strong Cambridge change is still a bit vague for me.
And even if my specific arguments about God aren't right, I think the weak/strong Cambridge change distinction is worth thinking about.
43 comments:
Alex
if God had created a different world, he would have been different intrinsically, because not only would his knowledge have been different, but also his intention would have been different.
The content of the intentions has to be partly extrinsically constituted, too.
Prior to creation there is nothing extrinsic to God. Suppose today you think about an object and tomorrow you produce it using your 3D printer. Today there is nothing extrinsic to you, it is all in your own mind. Except perhaps that your intention is partially based on real life examples. But that can't be true in God's case.
Don and I already responded to this worry.
The first solution is that there are an infinite number of reasons for different creations in God's mind. Which reasons can be truely attributed as intentions depends upon what God creates. They're virtually distinct across possible worlds.
The second solution is that God has one sole intention across all possible worlds: love. His intention is just realized in different ways across possible worlds. And yes, you don't need to mentally intend every specific detail in order for the action as a whole to be intentional. I don't specifically mentally intend to type every key that I am pressing, but my action to type this sentence is intentional.
HP
Both of your solutions imply that God doesn't control what He creates. It coped down to ' God intends lots of things but only a few of them are actually created and God doesn't decide which.
God's deciding which and Him creating are really the exact same thing.
HP
"God's deciding which and Him creating are really the exact same thing"
It doesn't matter when exactly God decides, what's important is that His decision differs between worlds.
So, what I said in my first reply to Alex is true. "If God had created a different world, he would have been different intrinsically, because not only would his knowledge have been different, but also his intention would have been different."
Walter,
In an earlier discussion (link below) on your view of intentions as mental states you ended it by saying that "we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions". This association of intentions and lack of control is your view, by your own admission. You haven't shown HP's view to entail this. You've simply asserted it.
http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2023/08/substances-and-their-existences.html?m=1
Don
No, I haven't simply asserted it, I have argued for it. You may not agree with my argument, but it is not an assertion.
BTW, my association of intentions and lack of control is not really relevant to this discussion. Yes, I think that we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions, but even if we did have such control, it would still mean that our intention to do X is different from our intention to do Y. It does not matter where our intentions come from for this to be true, they may even be brute facts.
Walter,
You cited lack of control in regards to HP's proposed solutions. Even if that is a feature of his view (though it isn't), I'm noting that your view has the same feature. So it is relevant.
This is your initial reply to HP: "Both of your solutions imply that God doesn't control what He creates. It coped down to ' God intends lots of things but only a few of them are actually created and God doesn't decide which." There is no argument there. Your second reply to HP doesn't mention lack of control. If you have an argument for why HP's proposed solutions imply that "God doesn't control what He creates", you haven't presented it here.
Don
'God intends lots of things but only a few of them are created and God doesn't decide which' is what I think is what HP's proposed solution entails. If it's not, it's up to HP to tell us why this doesn't follow, but AFAICT, I simply paraphrase his solution.
Now, feel free to Tell me where my paraphrase goes wrong, but I see no room for any control. So far, brother you, not HP or Alex have given any argument for this supposed control, us, to borrow from you, simply asserted with nothing to back it up.
The fact that Lack of control is a feature of my view is irrelevant because we are not discussing my view here and I am not the one claiming there is an entity that controls virtually every aspect of reality
'brother' should be 'neither'.I admit that I don't have full control over my smartphone.
Paraphrasing is not an argument.
I never claimed that I or HP gave an argument.
Paraphrasing is an argument if the paraphrase shows the implications of the claim, which leave no room for control.
The lack of control follows directly from HP's claims as they stand.
Now, if you have any argument for why something that seems to leave no room for control, actually does allow for control, then I am very much looking forward to hear it.
Otherwise, this discussion is pointless.
May I paraphase what you have said instead of providing an argument, just as you have done?
Sure, if you think you can do that without strawmanning me.
I have engaged in philosophical argumentation but never a paraphrase exchange, so I would like to know the rules first. There are rules of logic which apply to arguments where we can tell where an argument is sound by determining if the argument is structurally valid (no fallacies) and the premises true. By what metric are we to determine if a paraphrase involves strawmanning?
By analysing it and comparing it to the original.
Maybe I was strawmanning HP, I don't think so, but perhaps you can tell me why my paraphrasing does not corespond to the original, IOW why HP's solutions do not come down to 'God intends lots of things but only a few of them are created and God doesn't decide which'.
Should be simple.
If you want simple, the simplest explanation is: it's not what he said. Putting that aside, this is HP's actual quote:
"The first solution is that there are an infinite number of reasons for different creations in God's mind. Which reasons can be truely attributed as intentions depends upon what God creates. They're virtually distinct across possible worlds.
The second solution is that God has one sole intention across all possible worlds: love. His intention is just realized in different ways across possible worlds. And yes, you don't need to mentally intend every specific detail in order for the action as a whole to be intentional. I don't specifically mentally intend to type every key that I am pressing, but my action to type this sentence is intentional."
Which words from of each solution are you paraphrasing as "God doesn't decide which"?
"Which reasons can be truely attributed as intentions depends upon what God creates.. "
So, the creatures determine God's intention. He doesn't decide which reasons will be His intentions. if He did, His intentions would be intrinsic to God.
"His intention is just realized in different ways across possible worlds. "
In world 1, his intention is realized by the creation of A, in w2 it is realized by the creation of B and that is 'just' a brute fact. if it's not a brute fact there is a reason for it and, again, this reason must be intrinsic to God.
And, BTW, I did specifically mentally intend to type every key that I was pressing.
This post is fully intentional, except perhapsfor the mistakes. But maybe God can make mistakes too?
Thanks. I think I understand your interpretation better now. It makes sense but I don't agree because I still think it involves assumptions which aren't in HP's original text.
1) Are you reading the phrase "depends upon what God creates" as meaning God doesn't decide what He creates?
2) That the word "just" implies something is a brute fact is **just** not true.
Don
Yes, that's thé way I read 'feprnds upon God's creation. And I have you the reason why this is so.
As for brute facts, I agree thatjust' doesn't always imply something is a brute fact, but I also explained why it is in this case.
Do you interpret the phrase "depends upon what the judge sentences" as meaning the judge doesn't decide what she sentences?
No, but that is a completely different situation.
Do you interpret the phrase "depends upon what David says" as meaning David doesn't decide what he says?
No, but that is a completely different situation.
I'll tell you tomorrow why that is the case, but I too tired now.
Just had a good night's sleep, so here we go.
HP's original response was to what I wrote, "Prior to creation there is nothing extrinsic to God. Suppose today you think about an object and tomorrow you produce it using your 3D printer. Today there is nothing extrinsic to you, it is all in your own mind. Except perhaps that your intention is partially based on real life examples. But that can't be true in God's case."
Now, what the judge sentences or what David says both imply intrinsic motivations on the part of the judge and David.
But God, according to Alex, does not have different intrinsic motivations. The standard Classical theist holds that God is His will and His motivations. God does not will, "Let there be A" in w1, and "Let there be B" in w2. According to HP'solution, which reasons can be truely attributed as intentions depends upon what God creates. Contrary to the judge or David, whose words depend on their intentions, God's intentions depend on His creation.
IOW, creation somehow causes God's decision. So God has reasons for A and reasons for B, but until A or B exists, He does not intend either of them.
Maybe you can solve this problem, and if you do, I will be grateful, because I have discussed this with lots of Classical Theists, and nobody has ever been able to solve it.
Now that's an argument. Thank you. HP was speaking about intentional action in general, not exclusively about God, which is why he referenced an instance of human intentional action with the keyboard/typing example.
The solution (imo) is to disregard intentional action as involving mental states (which are usually called "intentions"). I read HP as trying to use the word "intention" but modify it as not involving mental states (which would obviously be intrinsic). I prefer to not use the word "intention" at all when discussing possible solutions in order to avoid any confusion. We discussed this on a previous post and the conclusion (per your own admission) of intentional action involving intentions as mental states is that the "we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions." This is the conclusion of that view. It is problematic for ALL intentional action, whether divine or human. So, yes, if you are reading HP as assuming intentions are mental states then you would be correct. I did not read HP as doing this. Either way, in my opinion the Classical Theist solution has always been to understand intentional action (divine or human) as not involving mental states.
I don't think HP was talking about intentional action in general , as he explicitly mentioned God in his solutions. That we have no control over our original intentions does not entail that intentions do not Involve mental states. We can have mental states without controlling them.
No matter how you define intentional actions, you still need an explication for why the sale intention can lead to A of B and whether A of B is doen is still under your control.
'sale' should be 'same '
"That we have no control over our original intentions does not entail that intentions do not Involve mental states." I didn't say this. I quoted you from an earlier post at the conclusion of our discussion on intentions that involve mental states where you said that "we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions." It's not that a lack of control over our original intentions entails mental state intentions; rather, it's that mental state intentions entails a lack of control over the initial formation of our intentions.
I think that any sort of intention entails a lack of control over the initial formation of our intentions.
Which is why I said I would rather describe the classical theist position in terms of intentional action (but intentional action which doesn't involve mental state intentions) rather than using the language of intentions. But we already discussed this previously so no need to go down that road again.
OK, but then you'll have to account for how the same intentional act can result in A in w1 and in B in w2.
Agreed. I think that can be done. We've discussed it a bit before but I think we're just going to have to agree to disagree on that point.
Don
You think it can be done, that's fine, but I would very much like somebody to explain how it can be done. I have never heard or read anyone who could do that. in fact, at this stage, the conversation usually stops.
I don't mind to agree to disagree, but in this case I have nothing to agree or disagree about.
Anyway, thank you for the discussion.
Thanks for the discussion.
Gaven Kerr discusses this other view of intentional action (which goes back to Aristotle) in the following video, starting around the 1:28:08 mark.
https://youtu.be/Kbj5xZL4E2U?si=yZaqERC45-fng_Uz
He also discusses it in this podcast:
https://www.classicaltheism.com/intentionalaction/
Don
Thank you for the links.I will have a look at them when I have the time.
Don
I have watched and listened the video and the podcats, but I am afraid that they do not answer my questions. I can still see no possible control over creation.
So, I'll have to agree to disagree with Gaven Kerr on this.
Thanks for watching and listening!
@Don Could you point to some resources, conversations or blogposts about this specific classical theist position? Of intentions not being mental states? Sounds really interesting and important!
Gaven Kerr discusses it starting around the 1:28:08 mark of the following video.
https://youtu.be/Kbj5xZL4E2U?si=yZaqERC45-fng_Uz
He also discusses it in this podcast:
https://www.classicaltheism.com/intentionalaction/
OP
" But it also seemed right to think there is a tension between God’s timelessness and the A-theory of time, thereby yielding an argument against the A-theory."
Rather, that tension yields and argument against the existence of god, the A-theory of time is just fine without god.
"But while any timeless being is immutable, the other implication need not hold: timelessness is a stronger condition than immutability, and hence there could be a tension between divine timelessness and the A-theory even if there isn’t a tension between immutability and the A-theory. Here is why I see a tension."
Again, the tension is between thinking rationally and believing in god.
These tensions between time and simplicity and changelessness and changing knowledge of a changing cosmos all go away very simply.
Allow me to ease, eliminate, your tension.
God does not exist. Tension gone. Talk about simplicity!
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