In some games like Mafia, uttering falsehoods is a part of the game mechanic. These falsehoods are no more lies than falsehoods uttered by an actor in a performance are lies.
Now consider a variant of poker where a player is permitted to utter falsehoods when and only when they have a Joker in hand. In this case when the player utters a falsehood with Joker in hand, there is no lie. The basic communicative effect of uttering s is equivalent to asserting “s or I have a Joker in hand (or both)”, though there may be additional information conveyed by bodily expression, tone of voice, or context.
If this analysis of poker variant is correct, then the following seems to follow by analogy. Suppose, as many people think, that it is morally permissible to utter falsehoods in “assertoric contexts” to save innocent lives. (An assertoric context is roughly one where the speaker is appropriately taken to be asserting.) Given that we are always playing the “morality game”, by analogy this would mean that in paradigm instances when we utter a declarative sentence s, we are actually communicating something like “s or I am speaking to save innocent lives.” If this is right, then it is impossible to lie to save innocent lives, just as in my poker variant it is impossible to lie when one knows one has the Joker in hand (unless maybe one is really bad at logic).
The above argument supports this premise:
- If it is morally permissible to utter falsehoods in assertoric contexts to save innocent lives, it is not possible to lie to save innocent lives.
But:
- It is possible to lie to save innocent lives.
I conclude:
- It is not morally permissible to utter falsehoods in assertoric contexts to save innocent lives.
In short: lying is wrong, even to save innocent lives.
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