Theists are sometimes accused of being anthropocentric in their worldview.
Yet in a typical naturalistic worldview, rational animals are at the axiological pinnacle of reality, the only beings with dignity. And the only rational animals we know of are humans. (Though I suppose naturalisms that have a large multiverse are committed to an extremely high probability of there being other rational animals.)
The theist, on the other hand, thinks that rational animals like us are near the bottom of the great chain of being, since there is a finite distance between us and nothingness, and an infinite distance between us and the top of the chain, namely God.
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But Dr. Pruss, the naturalist (in my experience) will often simply deny the axiological worth of human beings wholesale. He might not live that way after the conversation, to be sure, but it's not an uncommon dialectical move.
By being a value irrealist? Or by thinking that there are non-persons that are more valuable than persons?
Yes, by being a moral/value antirealist (unfortunately!)
That's pretty common among non-philosophical naturalists, though rather less so among philosophical naturalists. I tend to ignore such a view, just as I ignore idealism, solipsism, anti-realism about mathematics, etc. :-)
I think it used to be that a lot of atheists outside of philosophy would identify as "humanists", and that would imply weighty ethical commitments. I don't have statistics, but I feel like things have changed.
Honestly, that's fair. One cannot address every view, after all. But if I may ask, why do you ignore idealism (whether analytic or theistic)? I am not an idealist (I think some kind of holistic dualism or maybe hylomorphism is plausible), but I've heard that Joshua Rasmussen and others (e.g., Kastrup) are.
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