What a terrible argument: 1) Is it obvious that being in the image of God is something that a person could appear like? 2) It is similarly obscure how the "probably" follows (because from someone appearing to be perfect, it would not follow that they were probably perfect unless the perceiver was a good judge of such things). 3) The truth of this premise is almost as obscure as the first; could an alien be in the image of a unicorn, or not? 4) Should there be a "probably" in the conclusion? I can only conclude that this was a deliberately terrible argument, and so I am curious as to why it was.
Regarding 1, I think it is not uncommon for parents looking at their newborn infant or lovers looking in the eyes of their beloved to see the other as in the image of God. I suppose it's a variety of religious experience.
The move from 1 to 2 uses phenomenal conservatism: the thesis that absent other evidence, that something appears to be a certain way is a reason to think it is that way. It is plausible that without something like this we can't get out of skepticism.
I think 3 could use a lot of discussion. I think there is a more and a less loaded sense of the imago Dei. In the more loaded sense, that something is in the image of God entails that God exists. In the less loaded sense, it doesn't. Perhaps in the less loaded sense, that something is in the image of God means that the item is intrinsically such that if God existed, it could be in the image of God. In this case, unless we accepted the conclusion of the argument, we wouldn't think 3 is necessary. But 3 could still be true.
It's not meant to be a deductive argument, so there is no "probably" in the conclusion.
Sorry for thinking that it was a deliberately terrible argument. I was assuming that it was meant to be a deductive argument, but I guess now that the title of the post was a good clue that it was not! And I now like (1) and (2).
If God doesn't exist, then the beauty of the world is very mysterious, so there is a similar argument from the beauty of the world to the existence of God. And the argument from wonderful people is, I think, a better argument than that one (loving people is better than loving beauty). I wonder whether the argument from good actions would be even better (maybe it would be worse because God is primarily a person, not a means to an end).
Thanks for making me see how wrong I can be about even a simple argument (I find such experiences invaluable).
4 comments:
What a terrible argument: 1) Is it obvious that being in the image of God is something that a person could appear like? 2) It is similarly obscure how the "probably" follows (because from someone appearing to be perfect, it would not follow that they were probably perfect unless the perceiver was a good judge of such things). 3) The truth of this premise is almost as obscure as the first; could an alien be in the image of a unicorn, or not? 4) Should there be a "probably" in the conclusion? I can only conclude that this was a deliberately terrible argument, and so I am curious as to why it was.
Regarding 1, I think it is not uncommon for parents looking at their newborn infant or lovers looking in the eyes of their beloved to see the other as in the image of God. I suppose it's a variety of religious experience.
The move from 1 to 2 uses phenomenal conservatism: the thesis that absent other evidence, that something appears to be a certain way is a reason to think it is that way. It is plausible that without something like this we can't get out of skepticism.
I think 3 could use a lot of discussion. I think there is a more and a less loaded sense of the imago Dei. In the more loaded sense, that something is in the image of God entails that God exists. In the less loaded sense, it doesn't. Perhaps in the less loaded sense, that something is in the image of God means that the item is intrinsically such that if God existed, it could be in the image of God. In this case, unless we accepted the conclusion of the argument, we wouldn't think 3 is necessary. But 3 could still be true.
It's not meant to be a deductive argument, so there is no "probably" in the conclusion.
Sorry for thinking that it was a deliberately terrible argument. I was assuming that it was meant to be a deductive argument, but I guess now that the title of the post was a good clue that it was not! And I now like (1) and (2).
If God doesn't exist, then the beauty of the world is very mysterious, so there is a similar argument from the beauty of the world to the existence of God. And the argument from wonderful people is, I think, a better argument than that one (loving people is better than loving beauty). I wonder whether the argument from good actions would be even better (maybe it would be worse because God is primarily a person, not a means to an end).
Thanks for making me see how wrong I can be about even a simple argument (I find such experiences invaluable).
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