Here’s an argument for non-materialism about all organisms.
Start with these premises:
Organisms exist.
If organisms exist, it is possible to have two organisms that have all their matter in common.
Antisymmetry of parthood: Two distinct things can’t each be a part of the other.
Strong supplementation: If y isn’t a part of x, then y has a part that doesn’t overlap x.
Now suppose that x and y are two organisms that have all their matter in common. By antisymmetry of parthood, they can’t both be mutual parts of each other. Swapping labels if necessary, suppose y isn’t a part of x. Then by strong supplementation, y has a part z that doesn’t overlap x. But any material part of y is a material part of x by (2). Thus, y has a part that isn’t a material part. Hence:
- It is possible to have an organism with a non-material part.
But this is weak in two ways. First, it doesn’t show that any actual organism has a non-material part. Second, even if we showed that, that wouldn’t show that all organisms have non-material parts. Moreover, I have given no argument for premise 2.
I will fix all these problems together. In a recent post, I gave a plausible construction of a world where there is a dog-like organism and a cat-like organism with all their matter in common. The same construction would give the following conclusion: there is a world where there is a mushroom-like organism and a grass-like organism thathave all their matter in common. Plugging that into the above argument yields:
- Possibly a mushroom-like or a grass-like organism has a non-material part.
The likeness here is functional: the way of life of the organism is like that of mushroom or a grass plant. Then add:
If possibly a mushroom-like organism has a non-material part, all organisms have non-material parts.
If possibly a grass-like organism has a non-material part, all organisms have non-material parts.
From 5-7, we get:
- All organisms have non-material parts.
Why believe 6 and 7? Here’s a thought. You might think that conscious animals have to have souls or something like that. But if a mushroom- or grass-like organism can have a non-material part, probably it actually does, and if it has a non-material part, probably all organisms do.
There is a lot in this argument that doesn’t personally convince me. In fact, I am skeptical of premises 2 and 4, and my main reason for accepting 6 and 7 is that I already accept anti-materialism about all organisms. But I think the argument has some force.
2 comments:
The interplay between parthood, parthood sharing, and material constitution here is quite fascinating. Trying to untangle how distinct organisms could hypothetically share identical matter pushes the boundaries of standard mereology. It is a bit like setting up a secure outdoor structure where you need rugged protection and heavy duty tarpaulin that can withstand harsh exposure—even when two setups look identical on the surface, their underlying framework or purpose can be entirely different. While I remain a bit skeptical about the stronger conclusions regarding non-material parts for every organism, the formal breakdown of strong supplementation gives plenty of food for thought.
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