Take Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist case. Here is a quick and simple argument for why it’s wrong to disconnect from the violinist in order not to be connected to them for nine months.
It’s wrong to perform a positive action known to cause an innocent person’s death without a reason proportionate to the harm of death to someone who can be expected to live many years of a normal life otherwise.
The harm of death to someone who can be expected to live many years of a normal life otherwise is clearly disproportionate to being free for nine months from being connected to someone.
Disconnecting from the violinist is a positive action known to cause the death of an innocent person who can be expected to live many years of a normal life otherwise.
Thus, it is wrong to disconnect from the violinist in order not to be connected to them for nine months.
Premise 1 is a consequence of most versions of the Principle of Double Effect, but is also independently extremely plausible. Premise 3 is part of the story.
Why believe premise 2? Here’s one criterion of disproportionateness. A sufficient condition for a harm H1 to be disproportionate to a harm H2 is that a reasonable person would with little hesitation accept a harm that’s twice as bad as H2 to avoid H1. But a reasonable person would with little hesitation accept 18 months of being connected to someone to save their life, assuming they can be expected to live many years of a normal life if saved.
To see this, imagine you are the violinist, and you are about to die of kidney problems. But then someone shows up who offers to hook themselves up to you for 18 months, after which you will be cured. You might hesitate whether to accept their generosity. But you wouldn’t hesitate much before concluding they are offering you a great benefit, and if you were to hesitate much to accept it, that would only be because you might be concerned about being so much in debt to the generous benefactor. The fact that you would have to live for 18 months hooked up to them, a quite significant burden admittedly, would be a price well worth paying for your life.
Or imagine this. You have just been conceived. An angel now miraculously gives you the intelligence of a reasonable adult, and informs you that you have a cancer that will kill you within a few days. However, the angel tells you that if you just ask, you will be cured of that cancer, and can expect a normal human life. But there is a price to be paid for the cure: For the next 9 months you will be confined to a small space within another human being, after which for the next 9 months you will be unable to walk, talk, or exercise any significant personal freedom. This is a price well worth paying for life! It is a price we have all paid involuntarily, but surely anyone who is fortunate enough to live a normal human life will think that price would have been worth paying voluntarily. And yet those 18 months of dependency and lack of freedom are more constraining than 18 months of being hooked up to the violinist would be.
I can now argue as follows:
If it is wrong to disconnect from the violinist in the “standard scenario” above, abortion is wrong in the case of a normal pregnancy.
Therefore, abortion is wrong in the case of a normal pregnancy.
Now, one could vary the violinist story so that the analogue of premise 2 will no longer hold. Perhaps if the nine months were filled with torture, or if the violinist were to live only for a few months after the nine month period was over, then the analogue of premise 2 wouldn’t hold. In those cases, the Principle of Double Effect might well allow disconnecting from the violinist, and in those cases, the above argument against abortion fails.
Does it follow that in such hard cases of pregnancy, an abortion would be permissible? It does not follow, since there are further wrong-making features in the abortion case, including: (a) the parent-child relationship, (b) the fact that the abortion requires a lethal direct attack on another human being’s body (the analogue to the “tubes” connecting one to the violinist in the case of pregnancy may be the umbilical cord, which is the child’s organ), and (c) the fact that living in utero constitutes ordinary life-support for someone in the first nine months of their life. But that would be material for another post.
7 comments:
"Disconnecting from the violinist is a positive action known to cause the death of an innocent person who can be expected to live many years of a normal life otherwise."
Saying that this premise is part of the story might be a bit too fast. I think most people (including me) would either deny premise 3, or insist that the terms should be reformulated. In the case of the violinist story, you are not responsible for the causal chain that leads to (in a known and intended way) the death of a human person. You're simply refusing to continue providing extraordinary support, which seems permissible. (Eg. even if you have a very rare blood type, you are not obligated to start, or even continue donating your blood to the people who badly need it, if eg. the donations would cause significant difficulty to you.)
This clearly does not hold in the case of abortion, where those performing the abortion are responsible for the causal chain that leads to the death of a human person.
The term 'positive action' seems to do the work here, which is a bit of a vague term (but maybe I'm wrong about that), and it's rather dubious whether disconnecting from the violinist is accurately described by that.
Cutting a tube is a positive action: it's a doing rather than a refraining, with death as an expected result. In itself, it's the same kind of action as cutting the oxygen tube in a diver's suit while they're underwater.
The further intentions, of course, may be different.
Let's take this scenario instead: Imagine someone kidnaps you, locks you up in a hospital and ties you to a bed, places futuristic, high-tech robotic arms and technology around you, and initiates a process so that this robotic system is going to perform surgery on you and take out one of your kidneys. They did this to you so that they could save someone who is in dire need of a transplant. Let's say you somehow found a way by which this process can be shut down, and manage to trigger it while being locked up in the bed, eg. by pushing a button, or cutting an electrical wire. Clearly, what you did was permissible, yet it was (by your standards) a positive action, a doing rather than refraining, with death as an expected result: this was the only way that person was going to get a kidney. And this scenario seems to me a much better paralell to the violinist case.
I do find your intuition about this new (interesting!) case plausible. But it feels different. I think some of the reason is that preventing invasive surgery that deprives you of a kidney is a better candidate for something that's proportionate than terminating nine months of connection to the violinist.
Still, here is are two more robot cases that worry me. Label yours as R1.
Case R2: A robot is going to perform robotic surgery on you and remove and then destroy a kidney. There is only one way to stop the robot: by redirecting a trolley to hit it. But behind the robot there is a perfectly healthy violinist. If you redirect the trolley to hit the robot, the trolley will keep on going after destroying the robot and will kill the violinist.
Case R3: A robot is going to perform robotic surgery on you and remove and then destroy a kidney. The only way to stop it is to direct a trolley into it. However, this robot is also the one and only prototype that can save the violinist's life.
I have a strong intuition that in your R1 it's OK to stop the robot, but also a strong intuition that in R2 it's wrong to redirect the trolley. Do you share the intuition? If so, what do you think is the difference?
I think something people sometimes say about the Thomson violinist case is that you don't kill the violinist, but his underlying condition kills him. But then in R3, it should be OK to redirect the trolley, because there it is the underlying condition that would kill the violinist.
I find R3 difficult. It's like R1 in that it is the underlying condition would kill the violinist, but it's also like R2 in that it seems redirecting the trolley is wrong.
The more I think about R3, the more I think it's wrong to redirect in R3. Consider:
S1. You're about to have surgery that will save you from something as non-lethally harmful as the robotic surgery on you in R1-R3 (maybe one of your kidneys is about to non-lethally implode if you don't have the surgery). You get a text from a friend that the violinist needs emergency surgery to save their life, and that he is on the way to the hospital. The surgeon doesn't know. There is only one surgeon in town. If they start working on you, they won't be able to save the violinist. It they work on the violinist, it'll be too late to prevent the non-lethal harms to you. Is it permissible to let the surgeon keep on going with the operation on you?
It is clear to me that in S1 you ought to stop the surgeon and tell them to wait for the violinist instead. And if so, then a fortiori you may not destroy the surgery robot in R3. (Why a fortiori? Because typically commission is more difficult to justify than omission.)
If your intuitions track mine so far, then we have this: In R1, it's OK to stop the robot, while in R3, it's wrong to redirect the trolley. At this point, I see only one relevant difference between R1 and R3: in R1, the harm to you causes the violinist to be saved, while in R3, the harm to you is irrelevant to saving the violinist. Is that a decisively relevant difference? I don't know!
If it isn't decisively relevant, then I think I should say that in R3 it's wrong to redirect, so in R1 it's wrong to stop the robot. If it is decisively relevant, I should say that in R3 it's wrong to redirect, but in R1 it's OK to stop the robot. At this point, the question of whether in the original violinist case it's OK to disconnect may depend on one's judgment about the degree of harm to oneself in your R1 versus in continuing with the connection to the violinist. I think in your R1, the harm is quite a bit worse, so it could be that it's wrong to disconnect from the violinist (I still feel that it is), but not wrong to stop the robot in R1.
Very interesting cases that you have brought up. I think I share you intuitions about R2.
I also think the difference lies in the distinction you brought up: in R1, I did not initiate a causal sequence leading to the death of the violinist, what killed him was his underlying condition. In R2, this doesn't hold.
My initial intuition, upon reading, was that in R3 it is permissible to direct the trolley at the robot.
But I also agree, at least initially, about S1, so I am indeed puzzled.
After thinkinkg about it, I now think that destroying the robot in R3 is not always permissible, but sometimes it is, and it probably depends on proportionality. (If destroying your kidney would set you back significantly in your health and maybe even life expectancy, and we sprinkle on top that you have children that you need to care for etc., then I think proportionality would be met due to the interests of you and your loved ones having a heigher weight than the unknown violinists, and destroying the robot would be permissible.) But I also feel that the fact that both R1 and R3 feel like cases of self-defense from a violent party, unlike S1, is relevant to the question.
I'm not that certain about R1 anymore, but I still think that it is generally permissible,
mostly because it's hard for me to see how it would be permissible to simply refuse to provide a transplant to someone in need, which we all do every day, by omission, and yet not be permissible to refuse it if it involved stopping a surgery forced on you.
After thinking about the violinist case, I now agree that in some cases, depending on proportionality (the state of your life, what those 9 months would do etc.) it would probably be wrong to disconnect.
(But I also think that this is not the (main) reason abortion is wrong, as you said at the end of your post .)
We're pretty much on the same page.
I do feel it makes a significant difference whether one permanently loses a kidney or is restricted in one's activities for less than a year. It's not just the consequences of not having a second kidney, but the loss of bodily integrity in having it removed.
I think a kidney is kind of borderline for proportionality here. Remember my post's sufficient condition for lack of proportionality. Avoiding harm H at the cost of someone else's life is disproportionate when no reasonable person would hesitate to accept double the harm of H to save their own life. I think no reasonable person would hesitate to accept losing a kidney to save their own life, but once we ask about *double* the harm of losing a kidney, I think we get close to the hesitation region.
I don't know what *double* the harm of losing a kidney would be. Maybe it's something like having your kidney removed, and then having a second surgical operation to remove half of your liver? I think I wouldn't hesitate to have that done to me to save my life, but it would be getting close to the hesitation region.
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