According to Aquinas, in substantial change, the matter persists. This is philosophically troubling, because matter seems to be identified by form, and in substantial change, the substantial form is replaced by a new one. On Brower‘s plausible reading, Aquinas’ solution is that the chunk of matter counts as a chunk in virtue of its dimensions, so a chunk of matter can be identified by its dimensions across a substantial change.
This solution is problematic. Suppose you have a flower and you put it under a press, roots and all. You slowly and continuously turn the crank, and the flower is squished. Eventually, the flower dies, substantially changing into a floral organic clump. But notice that the dimensions are continually changing in the process. The floral organic clump has different dimensions from the flower. Granted, the change is continuous, so the dimensions of the flower a fraction of a second before its death and the dimensions of the clump a fraction of a second after death are very similar. But similarity is not sameness.
Could we say: You have the same chunk of matter at different times if the dimensions are similar? But that is quite implausible. Any cut-off in degrees of similarity seems arbitrary, and here we seem to be doing fundamental metaphysics.
Here is a less arbitrary move: You have the same chunk of matter at different times provided that between these times any change in dimensions is continuous.
The continuity move has some difficulties. First, it seems that even if in fact time is continuous, it could have been discrete. Now if time were discrete, then intuitively change of dimensions would not be continuous, and yet surely substantial change would still be possible. Interestingly, this intuition is not adopted by mathematicians: the standard topological story is that all functions from a discrete topological space to a topological space are continuous. But if we adopt mathematicians’ definition of continuity, then we have the problem that on this account the continuity criterion is always trivially satisfied, and hence if God annihilates a dog one moment and creates the moon the next moment, that would count as substantial change.
Perhaps, though, we could either insist that time cannot be discrete or that if time were discrete there would be no substantial change. This seems implausible, but let’s consider some additional difficulties with the continuity move. God could annihilate a dog and instantly create an ice sculpture of a dog with a shape, size and location continuous with those of the dog. This wouldn’t seem to be a case of substantial change. Likewise, it seems logically possible for God to kill a flower discontinuously, instantly distorting it into a floral organic clump of a different shape.
Here is another serious problem for all the variants of the dimension story. Suppose that a flower wilts, gradually changing its shape, and then finally dies. Suppose that the way it dies is that there is a last moment t1 of the flower’s existence, and at all times t > t1, the flower does not exist. Just as it dies, God annihilates the air around it and replaces it with pure hydrogen. Now after the flower’s death, there are two candidates for the matter of the flower. One candidate is the flower-shaped space occupied by the organic chemicals. Because the flower changes shape as it wilts, and doubtless the change continues after its death, that flower-shaped space is not exactly shaped like the flower was at t1. But now consider the matter in the precise flower-shaped space that was occupied by the flower at t1. This matter contains some of the organic chemicals of the flower and some of the new ambient hydrogen. By a continuity of dimensions criterion, this second chunk of matter is a better candidate for being the result of the flower’s substantial change. But this seems clearly mistaken.
(Granted, this story doesn’t work if there is no last moment of a substance’s existence, but instead there is a first moment t1 of a substance’s non-existence. But if that’s so, then presumably there is a first moment of a substance’s existence, and then we can tell a similar story at the beginning of the flower’s life.)
Here is a solution. I doubt Aquinas would endorse it, but I think he could, and it would not change his theory much. We need an account of the persistence of matter to account for the difference between substantial change and annihilation-creation. But what if we don’t take this difference metaphysically seriously, just as we don’t take metaphysically seriously the difference between a sandwich and a wrap? What if we just say that there is an ordinary language distinction, and we need a way of explaining what the ordinary language distinction roughly consists in? Then we need not worry about arbitrariness and can just say that the dimensions across the change must be “sufficiently similar”. That still leaves the air-replacement worry. But we can solve that by identifying matter in a metaphysically non-serious way not just by similarity of dimensions but by similarity of other properties. There is a multitude of things we can say here if we don’t take the identity of matter in substantial change metaphysically seriously, but simply as a way of finding application conditions for the ordinary language sentence “x changed into y”.
Here is a different reason for not taking identity of matter seriously. Collide an electron and a positron, resulting in two photons. Where is the matter of the electron? Is it in photon A, or in photon B, or partly in both? I suspect there is no fact of the matter here, either if we think about continuity or about the quantum mechanics. If we don’t take the identity of matter seriously, we can just say in semi-ordinary English “The electron and positron changed into two photons”, without worrying about what the electron changed into and what the positron changed into.
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