Thursday, November 19, 2026

Making easy ontology harder

On Thomasson’s “easy ontology”, existence is easy. There is a K as long as the “application conditions” for the phrase in our language “There is a K” are satisfied. And these application conditions don’t need to mention the existence of a K. It follows from this that ontology is very rich. If we can create application conditions for “There is a K”, then there will be entities of a sort that exist when and only when the actual application conditions for “There is a K” are met. Moreover, such existence for Thomasson is mind-independent. These entities would exist even if we never talked about Ks or created such application conditions.

A pleasant immediate consequence of the story is that necessarily something exists. For take the phrase “There is an Emptiness” to have the application condition that there isn’t anything in existence. Then if there weren’t anything in existence, the actual application conditions for “There is an Emptiness” would be satisfied, and so there would be something, namely an Emptiness.

But I think Thomasson’s story doesn’t work. We can set up a case such that:

  1. The application conditions for “There is a K” are satisfied.

  2. The application conditions for “There is an L” are satisfied.

  3. There are no application conditions for “There is something that is both a K and an L.”

  4. There are no application conditions for “There is something that is a K but not an L.”

Add this theorem schema of classical logic which holds for all noun-like expressions X and Y for which the antecedent is well-formed.

  1. If there is an X and there is a Y, then either there is a X-and-Y or there is an X-but-not-Y and a Y-but-not-X.

Now add Thomasson’s schema for every noun-like expression X for which “There is an X” is well-formed:

  1. There is an X if and only if the application conditions for “There is an X” are satisfied.

Contradiction ensues:

  1. There is a K. (1 and 6)

  2. There is an L. (2 and 6)

  3. It is not the case that there is something that is both K and L. (3 and 6)

  4. It is not the case that there is something that is K but not L. (4 and 6)

  5. There is no K or there is no L. (5, 9 and 10)

  6. Contradiction! (7 and 11)

How do we set up such a case? Easy. For instance, say that the application conditions for “There is a past equine absence” are satisfied provided that there once were no horses. Then the application conditions for “There is a past equine absence” are satisfied. We have condition (1). Second, let L be “causally efficacious” or “region of spacetime” or “fact”. The application conditions for “There is an L” are satisfied. However, we have no application conditions for “There is a something that is both a past equine absence and an L” and “There is something that is a past equine absence and not an L”. We could create such application conditions, of course. But we haven’t actually bothered to do so. To do so, we would need to make further linguistic decisions about how predication of past equine absences works.

Or say that “There is a tennis set score” provided that some people are playing tennis and there are numbers n and m such that n is the number of sets one side has won and m is the number of sets the other side has won. Let L be “is an ordered pair” or “is a property of games”.

The big issue here is this. If there is a K, then there is a vast number of additional facts about what the Ks are like. But the application conditions for “There is a K” do not contain enough information for these facts. We need application conditions for way more sentences.

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