Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Theological compatibilism and causal finitism

Aquinas thinks that it is possible for God to create a backwards infinite sequence of fathers and sons. Suppose that each time a son is born, the father freely decides on the son’s name. But there is a strange law of nature. There is an insignificant gene that is always passed from father to son. The gene comes in two variants, α and β, which are expressed the same way, so none of the people know anything about the difference. But whenever the father chooses a name with an even number of letters, by a mysterious law of nature (is there any other kind?) that none of the people know about, the son’s gene is flipped between the variants. Furthermore, the world is deterministic except for the free will exhibited in choosing names.

Let’s say we now have Fred who has the β variant. Fred’s dad, Bob, had the α variant, and it flipped to β when he gave his son a name with an even number of letters. Bob’s dad, Carl, on the other hand, had the α variant. Carl’s dad had the β variant. Call this world w1. Here the pattern of gene variants is ...βααβ.

Since this is a world where everything but free choices is deterministic, and the only free choices are the choices of names and God’s creative decision, it follows that this is a world where everything is determined by the choices of names, God’s creative decision, and the laws of nature.

But now imagine a different world, w2, with the same laws. But here Fred has α, his dad, Bob, has β, Bob’s dad, Carl, has β, and Carl’s dad has $\alpah$. The pattern of gene variants is ...αββα.

What determines the difference between w1 and w2? Well, given that the laws of nature are the same, and the names are the same so the only free decisions by the humans—the naming decisions—are the same, it must be that what determines the difference is God’s creative decision.

But what does the relevant aspect of God’s creative decision consist in? If theological compatibilism were true, God could first decide on the whole sequence of gene variants, and then make the agents freely choose an even-length name whenever the sequence flips and an odd-length name otherwise. Theological determinism makes the problem easy. And Aquinas is (arguably) a theological determinist. So there is no consistency problem for Aquinas.

What if Molinism is true? This is quite a bit trickier. Supposing that the gene variants do not in any way affect people’s naming decisions, we might suppose that God middle-knows that the sequence of lengths of names would have the pattern …, even, odd, even. Then God simply decides whether to make the genes be ...βααβ or ...αββα, since either sequence fits the choices equally well. But this won’t work well if the gene variant has some influence on the choice. (I take it that a gene cannot determine a free choice, but it can influence it.) For then the Molinist conditional that God has to consider has to have as its antecedent the sequence of gene variants. But that antecedent determines the even-odd sequence of the name lengths. I am not sure what is to be done.

Finally, what if simple foreknowledge or open theism are true? Then I throw up my hands in helplessness. I think in these cases, there is no way to divide up the deterministic explanation of what happens in w1 and w2 between God and the people in the world. Why? Because whatever God’s contribution is, it has to be explanatorily before all the free choices here. Thus on simple foreknowledge and open theism, it cannot depend on the choices. But if it cannot depend on the choices, then God in setting up the backwards infinite sequence of genes cannot ensure that they match the choices. (More detail is needed to make this a proof.)

I think the following is true:

  1. If God can create a backwards-infinite sequence of free agents whose choices affect all subsequent events, God can create worlds like w1 and w2.

I conclude:

  1. If simple foreknowledge or open theism is true, God cannot create a backwards-infinite sequence of free agents.

Additionally, the following is moderately plausible:

  1. If God can create a world with a backwards-infinite causal history, he can create a world with a backwards-infinite sequence of free agents whose choices affect all subsequent events.

If this is right, then:

  1. If simple foreknowledge or open theism is true, God cannot create a world with a backwards-infinite causal history.

Given the difficulties of the Molinist solution, this gives us support for this thesis:

  1. If theological compatibilism is false, causal finitism is true.

Unlike Aquinas, I deny theological compatibilism.

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