Aristotle on flourishing

Aristotle thinks that the flourishing of a kind of organism is primarily defined by the excellent exercise of the distinctive functions of the kind. This works great for us: our flourishing is primarily given by the excellent exercise of rationality.

But it doesn’t, I think, work well for other organisms. Think of cats and bears. It seems plausible that their primary flourishing is found in functions that they have in common, such as growth, reproduction, sensation, hunting, feeding, etc. They do have significant distinctive features, but these distinctive features are not central constituents of their flourishing.

One might take the above observations to be evidence for the three-species view of organisms, that there are three metaphysical species: plants, brute animals, and rational animals. But I think this runs into a problem with plants. For the flourishing of a plant is presumably constituted by growth and reproduction, which plants have in common with brute and rational animals.

I think we should reject the emphasis on distinctiveness in flourishing. Instead, we should probably say that the nature of an organism also specifies a prioritization in the functions of the organisms.