Theism and presentism

Suppose presentism is true and truths about other times are grounded in tensed facts, such as the fact that there were once dinosaurs.

Given presentism and theism, God is in time. Suppose, as the Abrahamic religions hold, that God created all contingent things a finite amount of time ago. Before God created them, it was contingently true that God will create them. This truth would be grounded in a contingent tensed fact. Hence before God created all contingent things, there already was a contingent thing—the tensed fact that God will create. A contradiction.

So the presentist needs to have a different solution to the grounding problem than positing tensed facts. The best alternative is positing tensed properties. Thus before creation something will have to have the property of being such that God will create. There is only one candidate for that something—God. For nothing else exists before creation. So God has a contingent property, contrary to divine simplicity. Thus presentist theists need to deny divine simplicity. That’s a big price!

One solution is a restricted presentism like Feser’s on which everything that exists is either present or timeless. Then we can suppose that time begins with creation. There may be other problems there.