Some people deny the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM--for all p, p or not-p) because they are convinced it leads to fatalism. But they really shouldn't deny LEM.
Suppose Helga is convinced that utilitarianism is true. You offer Helga a reductio argument against utilitarianism on the assumption that the hedonistic theory of happiness holds and another reductio argument against utilitarianism on the assumption that the hedonistic theory of happiness does not hold. Helga accepts both reductios and comes to deny hedonistic utilitarianism and non-hedonistic utilitarianism, but continues to accept utilitarianism. Pressed on how Helga's new position squares with logic, Helga asserts that based on her belief that utilitarianism holds, and her new beliefs that if hedonism holds, utilitarianism is not true, and if hedonism doesn't hold, utilitarianism is not true, she has concluded that LEM does not hold. There seems to be something irrational about this. Surely, she should either find fault with at least one of the reductios or abandon her belief in utilitarianism. It is hard to imagine premsies whose plausibility should trump LEM.
Arguments the depend on LEM are not, I think, uncommon in philosophy. If Molinism is true, evil and the existence of God are compatible (by Plantinga's free will defense). If Molinism is not true, evil and the existence of God are compatible (by Adams' free will defense). Hence, evil and the existence of God are compatible. It is pretty likely that Helga uses LEM-based arguments in other contexts, and it is pretty likely that the defender of the Open Future who denies LEM also uses LEM in other contexts.
Could they both say that LEM applies in some contexts (e.g., non-normative ones in Helga's case, or in ones that do not involve the future in the freedom case) but not others? Yes. But once we denied the plausible view that LEM follows from the meaning of the words "or" and "not", and denied the general intuition that between p and not-p tertium non datur, it seems that we have undercut the grounds we could have for thinking LEM holds even in those contexts in which it is supposed to hold in. Besides, the defender of the Open Future who denies LEM presumably does so on the basis of something like a temporalized modal logic according to which if p already holds, then not-p is no longer possible. But surely the principles of classical non-temporal non-modal logic are more plausible and more deeply embedded in our thinking than those of temporalized modal logic.
Anyway, it seems much better to hold on to LEM, and just deny the principle that if not(will(p)), then will(not-p), where "will(p)" means p will hold. The principle that if not(will(p)), then will(not-p) is a dubious one if we see "will" as a modal-type operator, maybe akin to "would" except for being a one-place operator, and that is precisely how we will see "will" if we have presentist or growing-block intuitions. Moreover, it is a principle that is less central to our thinking than LEM, particularly because it applies only to our thinking about the future, while LEM applies to all our thinking. It seems clear to me that this is what the person impressed by the argument for logical fatalism should say, boldly holding that there is a fact of the matter whether Jones will mow the lawn tomorrow: it is false that Jones will mow the lawn tomorrow, just as it is false that he will fail to mow the lawn tomorrow. And God's omniscience will be unrestricted: he knows that it is false that Jones will mow the lawn and that it is false that he will not mow the lawn.
Of course, it's best to hold on to both LEM and if not(will(p)), then will(not-p).