A problem for Van Inwagen's life condition for composition

Van Inwagen thinks that a plurality of xs composes something if and only if either there is only one thing among the xs or the xs have a life together.

He also agrees that the fundamental particles making up a cell in a multicellural organism have a life together, and so there are cells.

Here is a problem. The following seem true:

1. It is possible to have two overlapping cells in a multicellular organism neither of which is a part of the other.

2. The cells of a multicellular organism together with any intercellular fundamental particles have a life together.

Why think (1)? Because, first, conjoint twins show that multicellular organisms can have “proper overlap”: i.e., they have a part in common but neither is a part of the other, and it seems hard to deny that cells, too, could in principle be like that. Second, it seems plausible that mid-way through a process of mitosis we have two cells that properly overlap.

It seems hard to deny (2), assuming there are cells.

But now consider a multicellular organism which happens to have two overlapping cells. Its cells, together with any intercellular fundamental particles, have a life together. Hence, by van Inwagen’s famous account of composition, the cells and the intercellular fundamental particles compose something. But van Inwagen’s definition of composition includes a no-overlap condition: if the xs compose y, no two xs overlap. And yet in our case we have life and overlap.

What should van Inwagen do? One move would be to weaken the Special Composition Question. Instead of asking when the xs compose something, he could ask when non-overlapping xs compose something. But that makes his view rather less informative than we might think, if overlap between cells is fairly common. Presumably in a body of my size, at any given time, mitosis is occuring in a number of cells (I haven’t done the math, but it seems likely).

Can our cells be substances?

A standard Aristotelian principle says:

1. No substance is a part of another substance.

I was just struck by how (1) says less than it seems to. One interesting philosophy of biology question is whether our symbiont bacteria are part of us. But:

2. All bacteria are substances.

3. We are substances.

4. We are not bacteria.

5. So no bacteria are parts of us. (By 1-5)

This argument is fine as far as it goes. But there is a metaphysical possibility that its conclusion leaves open which it is easy to forget.

Let’s grant that our symbiont bacteria are not a part of us. But perhaps their matter is a part of us. In other words, maybe the bacteria are matter-form composites just as we are, but their matter is a part of our matter, whereas their form is not a part of us at all, and hence they as wholes are not parts of us. They merely overlap us in matter.

And the point can be generalized. Before I noticed this point today, I used to think that the Aristotelian commitment to (1) requires us to deny that our cells are substances. But (1) leaves open the possibility that our cells are substances whose matter is a part of us, while the cells as wholes are not parts of us.

I don’t really want to say this. I would like to supplement (1) with this principle which has generally been a large part of my reason for affirming (1):

6. The matter of one substance is never a part of another substance.

My reason for accepting (6) has been that the identify of the matter is grounded in its substance, and if the matter had its identity doubly grounded, it wouldn’t be one thing, but two, and so it wouldn’t be the same matter in each substance.

In fact, (6) is a special case of a stronger claim:

7. No two substances have any matter in common.

Here is an argument that establishes (7) directly. Start with this plausible thesis:

8. No two material substances have all of their matter in common.

But now if (7) is false, then it should be possible to have two plants that have some matter in common. We could further imagine that the non-common matter perishes, but both plants survive. If so, then we would have a violation of (8). So, it’s plausible that if (7) is false, so is (8).

Here is a different line of thought in favor of (7):

9. Matter is grounded in the accidents of a substance.

10. Two substances cannot have any accident in common.

11. If x is entity grounded in a and y is an entity grounded in b and a ≠ b, then x ≠ y.

12. So, two substances cannot have any matter in common.

So, all in all, while (1) leaves open the possibility of our cells and bacteria being substances and yet having their matter be a part of us, we have good reason to deny this possibility on other grounds.

It would be very neat if one could derive (1) from (7). From (7) we do directly get:

13. No substance with matter is a part of another substance.

But it would take more argument to drop the “with matter” qualifier.