Friday, November 2, 2007

Counting on people

It seems to me that there is an epistemological asymmetry when relying on the good or bad actions of others. Karla has a sterling character, and is an expert on the relevant topic, and he says p. I conclude that p. Patrick has a horrible character, and is an expert on the relevant topic, and it would clearly be in his interest to lie about this to me, and he says q. I conclude that not-q. The two conclusions may have extremely high probability based on the evidence about Karla's and Patrick's past behavior, but it is plausible to me that only the inference in Karla's case gives knowledge. Why? Because we have a right to count on someone's good character but have no right to count on someone's bad character, even if the probabilities of acting out of character are equally small.

Similarly, given past behavior, I think sometimes we are justified in believing that a particular person will do the right thing in some circumstances, not just that she will very likely do the right thing. But we are never justified in believing of a person that she will do the wrong thing in some circumstances, though we may be justified in believing that she will very likely do the wrong thing. It would be uncharitable to do so--she might reasonably complain that we shouldn't have formed such a belief, given her free will.

One might think the second case, and maybe the first, confuses moral justification with epistemic justification. But morality governs every aspect of our lives (this is clearest from a Jewish or Christian standpoint--we are to love God with every aspect of our lives), and in particular governs our believings.

2 comments:

Ross said...

Dr. Pruss,

Greetings. Let me first just say that I have realy enjoyed your blog since it has been up and running here.

I do have a question for you regarding this post, although I suppose that the issue I raise is not the main point of what you are arguing for here.

You said,
** morality governs every aspect of our lives (this is clearest from a Jewish or Christian standpoint--we are to love God with every aspect of our lives), and in particular governs our believings. **

I'm unsure that it is true that morality... in particular governs our believings. For example, I believe that there is a computer screen in front of me, and I would believe that whether I was currently doing something virtuous or something vicious.

In other words, how does morality play into mundane acts of belief?

Ross Parker

Alexander R Pruss said...

Well, we have a moral duty to pursue the truth. Consequently, we have a moral duty to act in ways that promote that duty and to refrain from acting in ways that oppose it. Accepting the evidence you have for the presence of the screen is morally good. It's not a great good, but it is good. One way to see this is to imagine someone who does the opposite, who rejects the evidence out of a misguided scepticism. That is vicious, indeed morally vicious (though perhaps not culpable), since it is a misuse of the mind and its abilities to doubt. Moreover, such sceptical practice makes one less capable of fulfilling our non-epistemic duties towards others.