Evil and the cosmological argument

Here is a valid non-deductive argument:

1. There are some evils whose best explanation involves an evil supernatural agent. (Premise)
2. Therefore, there is an evil supernatural agent, call him S. (By (1), ampliatively)
3. If there is a necessarily existing first cause of everything else, it is not an evil agent. (Premise)
4. There is a necessarily existing first cause of everything else. (Premise)
5. S is not the necessarily existing first cause of everything else. (By (2) and (3))
6. There is a necessarily existing first cause of everything who is a cause of S. (By (4) and (5))
7. The cause of a supernatural being is supernatural. (Premise)
8. There is a necessarily existing supernatural first cause of everything. (By (6) and (7))

The really controversial premises are (1), which by itself is sufficient to refute naturalism, (3), which I've argued for in this post, and (4), which requires a cosmological argument, which I've defended at length in print.

I bet there are other interesting theistic arguments starting with (2). One might, for instance, be able to argue that an evil agent cannot be simple and unchangeable, and an agent who is not simple and unchangeable must have a cause, and go on from there.