The following argument is valid:
- (Premise) If one compressed all the events of an infinitely long happy life into a minute, by living a year of events in the first half minute, then another year of events in the next quarter minute, and so on, then one would be exactly as well off as living the finite life as the infinite one.
- (Premise) If supertasks are possible, then the antecedent of (1) is possible for any infinitely long happy life.
- (Premise) If time is an actual continuum, supertasks are possible.
- (Premise) There is a possible an infinitely long happy life that would make for full human well-being.
- (Premise) A finitely long life could not make for full human well-being.
- (Premise) If a life makes for full human well-being, then so does any life that makes one exactly as well off.
- Therefore, if supertasks are possible, there is a finitely long life that would make for full human well-being (1, 2, 4, 6).
- Therefore, supertasks are impossible. (5, 7)
- Therefore, time is not an actual continuum. (3 and 8)