I think Pascal's wager could be seen as a way of destroying most of standard decision theory in the case of many agents. The reason for this is that just about any significant choice one makes will have the property that according to some religious views, that choice affects the probabilities of getting an infinite payoff, and unless the agent has a way of assigning zero epistemic probability to that religion, these infinitary considerations will swamp all the finite considerations. Thus, one wonders to oneself: "Should I self-flagellate?" There is an obvious answer: "No, because it hurts." But because there are religious views according to which such self-flagellation helps attain an infinite payoff, then unless one assigns zero probability to these views, the infinitary considerations swamp the finitary considerations coming from the fact that it hurts. One ends up having to compare the increased probability that one will get an infinite payoff if one self-flagellates on religious views that are pro-flagellation with the decreased probability of an infinite payoff on anti-flagellation religions, and the apparently relevant consideration that it hurts just drops out by the wayside (unless the infinitary considerations end up being perfectly balanced).
One might think one can dismiss the infinitary considerations because of problems with weighing infinities. But those can be solved fairly easily by adopting an appropriate version of non-standard arithmetic.
Maybe what this is, though, is not so much a reductio of standard decision theory, as a way of showing that practical rationality requires that one assign non-zero probability to at most one religious view (or maybe one moderately narrow family of closely-related religious views). Dogmatic atheists and dogmatic religionists would like this conclusion. And I am a dogmatic religionist, after all. :-)