I am not actually convinced by this argument. But let's go.
- If it is possible that whether an utterance expresses a proposition depends on what happens at the same time in distant places in the universe, then semantic externalism is true.
- It is possible that whether an utterance expresses a proposition depends on what happens at the same time in distant places in the universe.
- Therefore, semantic externalism is true.
I am not going to defend (1). It's fairly plausible, though I think it's actually a weak point. I want to defend (2). Suppose Fred and Janine are in distant places in the universe, and speak simultaneously. Fred says:
- The sentence Janine is now uttering is true.
Janine says:
- The sentence Fred is now uttering is not true.
It cannot be that both of Janine's and Fred's utterances succeed in expressing a proposition. For if they do, then if what Janine says is true, it is not true, and if what Janine says is not true, it is true, which is a contradiction. But in a world where Fred instead says:
- 2+2=5.
and Janine still says (5), what Janine utters does express a proposition—indeed, a true one. And in a world where Fred still says (4) but Janine says (6), Fred's utterance expresses a false proposition. So it must be that whether Janine's utterance expresses a proposition depends on what Fred says far away, or that whether Fred's utterance expresses a proposition depends on what Janine says far away. Either option is sufficient to yield (1).
2 comments:
Saying that a sentence does not express a proposition just because it results in truth value gluts would be seen as an ad hoc move by a dialetheist. Maybe that's the problem.
Sure, but it seems perfectly legitimate to assume classical logic when giving an argument for semantic externalism (or for anything else), except perhaps when arguing directly against a non-classical logician.
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