I've been feeling that there is some kind of an analogy between Anselm's version of the Ontological Argument (OA) and semantic paradoxes like the Liar or Curry's. Here is one analogy. I've argued in an earlier post that when the consequent in material-conditional Curry sentences is true, the Curry sentence is true, and when the consequent is false, the Curry sentence is nonsense. (The Curry sentence with consequent p is: "If this sentence is true, then p." There is a cool argument from the meaningfulness of the sentence to p.) If this is right, then we have a valid way of arguing from meaning to truth: We have sentences that are true if and only if they are meaningful (for when the consequent is true, the whole sentence is true). Now, I've always thought that Anselm's argument went through as soon as it were granted that one had a concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. However, as St. Anselm himself notes but does not make enough of, to have a concept is more than just have a sequence of words in one's head. Thus, it may well be that we have the sequence of words without them expressing a concept.
Just as the Curry sentence is true iff it expresses a proposition, so too the Anselmian predicate has a satisfier (i.e., God) iff it expresses a property. At the same time, this suggests a caution. It would be mistaken to try to figure out by introspection whether a Curry sentence with empirical consequent expresses a proposition, and likewise it may not be appropriate to figure out by introspection whether the Anselmian predicate expresses a property.