- If there are any Molinist counterfactuals, there are ungrounded true contingent propositions.
- Propositions reporting divine beliefs are grounded.
- If p is a contingent truth (i.e., true proposition), then either God's belief is explained constitutively or causally by p, or p is explained constitutively or causally, or there is some third truth that explains both p and God's belief constitutively or causally.
- An ungrounded truth cannot be explained causally.
- An ungrounded truth cannot explain causally.
- When a truth p explains q constitutively, something that grounds p grounds q.
- God believes every truth.
Premise (3) is a way of working out the idea that God's beliefs are knowledge and cannot be merely contingently related to what makes them true.
[Edited. This is an improved version of the argument. -ARP]