Truthtelling

Consider the two simplest views of the central moral rule governing assertion:

1. You should avoid saying falsehoods.
2. You should avoid saying something you don't believe.

Here is a consideration in favor of (1) over (2). Let's say I believe p and q, but assign a higher probability to p. Suppose that in some context my communicative purposes can be equally well met by asserting p or by asserting q. (Maybe I am asked to give one simple reason for believing r, and both p and q are equally good reasons.) Then, I have good moral reason to assert p rather than q. Why? Because, as far as I can tell, p is more likely to be true than q. But if (2) is the central moral rule, then it is not clear why I have any reason to prefer asserting p to asserting q. If, on the other hand, it is (1) that is the central moral rule, then by asserting p I lower the chance of going wrong.

My own view is neither (1) nor (2). It is something like this:

3. You should only assert (or, more generally, endorse) with the intention not to assert (endorse) anything false.

Now if I have an intention not to assert anything false, I will prefer to assert p rather than q—if for no reason at all I choose to assert q rather than p, then that shows that I did not actually intend not to assert anything false. For if I intend something, I act in favor of that. That does not mean I always maximize the chance of that something. But where I have no reason to the contrary, it seems that I do maximize that chance. It would be weird to say: "I think that the number 7 in this lottery is more likely to win; I intend to win and I bet my money on 3." It is, at least, irrational to act this way, and we should avoid irrationality, at least ceteris paribus.