The B-theory of time, according to which the distinctions between past, present and future (possibly unlike the distinctions between earlier-than and later-than) are merely perspectival, is often accused of being a "static theory of time".
But it is clearly a sufficient condition for x to change with respect to a predicate P that x satisfy P at one time and not at another. I am not claiming here that this is what change is. I am only claiming that satisfying a predicate at one time but not at an another is sufficient for change. How could something be round at one time and not round at another without its having changed in respect of roundness.
But of course it is a part of a typical B-theory that objects satisfy predicates at some but not at other times. In other words, something that is sufficient for change is a part of the B-theory. So how can be the B-theory be accused of being static?
Well, it could be the case that a theory T is incompatible with some phenomenon C (say, change) but nonetheless posits a phenomenon A (say, objects satisfying different predicates at different times). Such a theory is metaphysically incoherent, but of course there are metaphysically incoherent theories. So my response to the staticness charge (not the same as a static charge!) against the B-theory is not complete. But I think it shifts the onus of proof. Given that the B-theory of time posits something that clearly entails the phenomenon of change, if the theory is incompatible with the existence of change, the theory is metaphysically incoherent—and that has not been shown by its opponents. And it is too much to ask the B-theorist to prove the coherence of their theory, since showing metaphysical coherence is very hard in metaphysics. (Of course, one can prove a particular formalization of a theory to be formally coherent. And it's not hard to do that with the B-theory or the A-theory. But the question we're interested in is metaphysical coherence, not formal coherence.)
10 comments:
Suppose God snuffs some static particle out of existence. If existence is a predicate, does satisfying 'exists' at one time and then failing to at another time count as change? If not, then perhaps your condition isn't sufficient, perhaps because changing requires that the changed survives? Then again, perhaps existence is no predicate. Hmm.
It seems OK to say that that would be a change with respect to existence, no?
But isn't it true that a B-theory must posit perdurantism, and on perdurantism no entity endures from t1 to t2. So there just is no 'x' at t1 & t2. There must be an 'x' at t1 and a 'y' at t2. Thus there is no change. What have I missed here?
"But isn't it true that a B-theory must posit perdurantism"
No, why would it have to? :-)
"on perdurantism no entity endures from t1 to t2"
True, but change in respect of a predicate requires that an entity persist from t1 to t2. How it persists, whether by perdurance or endurance, seems to be a different question.
I've been reading William Lane Craig's "The Tenseless Theory of Time", Chapter 9. Craig argues that, based on the Principle of the Indiscernability of Identicals, an object 'O' at t1 could only be 'O' at t2 if it has all the same properties. But this does not seem to be true given the B-theory, since the entity at t1 still exists and has different properties than the entity at t2. His conclusion is that there are two different objects, not one and the same thing that has undergone change.
Is there a good counter to Craig's view? Is it necessary to challenge the PII to do so?
Also, for your second comment, how should one understand something persisting given perdurance?
Thank you for your insight, Doctor.
1. Indiscernibility of identicals tells us that if x=y, and x has property P, then y has property P. This applies just fine to properties like "being green at t1" or "being non-green at t2". It's just that the B-theorist has to relativize changing properties to times.
2. According to perdurance, an object persists at times t1 and t2 provided it has temporal parts at t1 and at t2.
I myself am inclined towards neither perdurance nor endurance, but stageless worm theory. Ordinary objects are four-dimensional. They don't have temporal parts. An object persists at times t1 and t2 provided it is partly located at t1 and partly located at t2.
Can a stageless worm have a mind and thus be a person? If so, is it compatible with libertarian free will?
I don't see why not?
Isn't the future determined (already in existence) on a B-theory view? Doesn't this imply fatalism?
Not causally.
Post a Comment