The B-theory of time, according to which the distinctions between past, present and future (possibly unlike the distinctions between earlier-than and later-than) are merely perspectival, is often accused of being a "static theory of time".
But it is clearly a sufficient condition for x to change with respect to a predicate P that x satisfy P at one time and not at another. I am not claiming here that this is what change is. I am only claiming that satisfying a predicate at one time but not at an another is sufficient for change. How could something be round at one time and not round at another without its having changed in respect of roundness.
But of course it is a part of a typical B-theory that objects satisfy predicates at some but not at other times. In other words, something that is sufficient for change is a part of the B-theory. So how can be the B-theory be accused of being static?
Well, it could be the case that a theory T is incompatible with some phenomenon C (say, change) but nonetheless posits a phenomenon A (say, objects satisfying different predicates at different times). Such a theory is metaphysically incoherent, but of course there are metaphysically incoherent theories. So my response to the staticness charge (not the same as a static charge!) against the B-theory is not complete. But I think it shifts the onus of proof. Given that the B-theory of time posits something that clearly entails the phenomenon of change, if the theory is incompatible with the existence of change, the theory is metaphysically incoherent—and that has not been shown by its opponents. And it is too much to ask the B-theorist to prove the coherence of their theory, since showing metaphysical coherence is very hard in metaphysics. (Of course, one can prove a particular formalization of a theory to be formally coherent. And it's not hard to do that with the B-theory or the A-theory. But the question we're interested in is metaphysical coherence, not formal coherence.)