I don't really want to commit to the following, but it has some attraction.
Question 1: What is probability?
Answer: Any assignment of values that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms or an appropriate analogue of them (say, a propositional one).
Question 2: Are probabilities to be interpreted along frequentist, propensity or epistemic/logical lines?
Answer: Frequency-based, propensity-based and epistemically-based assignments of weights are all probabilities when the assignments satisfy the axioms or an appropriate analogue of them. In particular, improved frequentist probabilities are genuine probabilities when they can be defined, but so are propensity-based objective probabilities if they satisfy the axioms, and likewise logical probabilities. Each of these may have a place in the world.
Question 3: But what about the big metaphysical and epistemological questions, say about the grounds of objective tendencies and epistemic probabilities?
Answer: Those questions are intact. But they are not questions about the interpretation of probability as such. They are questions about the grounds of objective propensity or about the grounds of epistemic assignments. Thus, the former question belongs to the philosophy of science and the metaphysics of causation and the latter to epistemology.
Question 4: But surely one of the interpretations of probability is fundamental.
Answer: Maybe, but do we need to think so? Take the axioms of group theory. There are many kinds of structures that satisfy these axioms. Why think one kind of structure satisfying the axioms of group theory is fundamental?
Question 5: Still, couldn't there be connections, such as that logical probabilities ultimately derive from propensities via some version of the Principal Principle, or the other way around?
Answer: Maybe. But even if so, that doesn't affect the deflationary theory. There are plenty more structures that satisfy the probability calculus that do not derive from propensities.
Question 6: But shouldn't we think there is a focal Aristotelian sense of probability from which the others derive?
Answer: Maybe, but unlikely given the wide variety of things that instantiate the axioms. Maybe instead of an Aristotelian pros hen analogy, all we have is structural resemblance.