Oppy (2009) argues that your reasons for F2 (on each of the 'positive property' interpretations) are also reasons for Oppy's premise 2 (p. 355). But then, following Oppy's reasoning, there is a much simpler path to C3. Indeed, so much simpler that it perhaps begs the question against atheism. What do you think?

Hello Mr. Pruss. I have been diligently following your work on the ontological argument and am almost convinced of the soundness of something like Godel's proof moving me quite close to a confessed theism. Your three papers on it as well as the many blog posts here have been very helpful. However what is extremely vexing is how when the concept of positivity is applied to truth it leads to a formal contradiction/paradox which is quite interesting/disturbing. The whole thing is outlined within this paper written by Gregor Damschen of Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg entitled "QUESTIONING GĂ–DEL’S ONTOLOGICAL PROOF: IS TRUTH POSITIVE?" (http://www.unilu.ch/files/damschen_european_journal_for_philosophy_of_religion_3_2011.pdf) If you could comment on this and how it applies to the soundness of these Godel like ontological arguments it would be much obliged as I know much talk is focused on the concept of positivity, i.e. what exactly are the repercussions for the arguments, such as does it refute it or is it just a interesting/trivial consequences, or does truth not play into the argument as truth itself isn't some sort of great making property, or that when analyzing truth it inevitably leads to paradoxes. This has been much bothering me and am not exactly sure what these arguments entail to. Much thanks in advance!

Sorry to post again but I forgot to mention that I think the major problem this article engenders is against the truth of the unity of perfections as axiom two leads to a contradiction when led to the truth values of the perfection statements. I am not sure if this is what its getting at but the contradiction seems to render perfection talk contradictory. I am not sure what this amounts to or how it can be rebutted but a more competent person here may be able to help me see how to move around this problem. Thanks again and apologizes for the double post. Best wishes -ashmen

This is the most powerful ontological argument in the literature at the moment, thank you very much Dr. Pruss. Have you seen any replies to this paper?

## 9 comments:

The link seems down?

Works fine on my phone.

Hi Alex,

Oppy (2009) argues that your reasons for F2 (on each of the 'positive property' interpretations) are also reasons for Oppy's premise 2 (p. 355). But then, following Oppy's reasoning, there is a much simpler path to C3. Indeed, so much simpler that it perhaps begs the question against atheism. What do you think?

Regards,

Emanuel

It's been a while, but I remember not being convinced that the reasons were as strong for Oppy's 2 as for my F2.

Hello Mr. Pruss. I have been diligently following your work on the ontological argument and am almost convinced of the soundness of something like Godel's proof moving me quite close to a confessed theism. Your three papers on it as well as the many blog posts here have been very helpful. However what is extremely vexing is how when the concept of positivity is applied to truth it leads to a formal contradiction/paradox which is quite interesting/disturbing. The whole thing is outlined within this paper written by Gregor Damschen of Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg entitled "QUESTIONING GĂ–DEL’S ONTOLOGICAL PROOF:

IS TRUTH POSITIVE?" (http://www.unilu.ch/files/damschen_european_journal_for_philosophy_of_religion_3_2011.pdf) If you could comment on this and how it applies to the soundness of these Godel like ontological arguments it would be much obliged as I know much talk is focused on the concept of positivity, i.e. what exactly are the repercussions for the arguments, such as does it refute it or is it just a interesting/trivial consequences, or does truth not play into the argument as truth itself isn't some sort of great making property, or that when analyzing truth it inevitably leads to paradoxes. This has been much bothering me and am not exactly sure what these arguments entail to. Much thanks in advance!

Sorry to post again but I forgot to mention that I think the major problem this article engenders is against the truth of the unity of perfections as axiom two leads to a contradiction when led to the truth values of the perfection statements. I am not sure if this is what its getting at but the contradiction seems to render perfection talk contradictory. I am not sure what this amounts to or how it can be rebutted but a more competent person here may be able to help me see how to move around this problem. Thanks again and apologizes for the double post. Best wishes -ashmen

On my version of the arguments, there is no Axiom 2. In other words a property P can be such that neither P nor non-P is positive.

This is the most powerful ontological argument in the literature at the moment, thank you very much Dr. Pruss. Have you seen any replies to this paper?

I think I've seen something but I can't remember where.

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