Start with Zeno's paradox of the arrow. Zeno notes that over every instant of time *t*_{0}, an arrow occupies one and the same spatial location. But an object that occupies one and the same spatial location over a time is not moving at that time. (One might want to refine this to handle a spinning sphere, but that's an exercise to the reader.) So the arrow is not moving at *t*_{0}. But the same argument applies to every time, so the arrow is not moving, indeed cannot move.

Here's a way to, ahem, sharpen The Arrow. Suppose in our world we have an arrow moving at *t*_{0}. Imagine a world *w** where the arrow comes into existence at time *t*_{0}, in exactly the same state as it actually has at *t*_{0}, and ceases to exist right after *t*_{0}. At *w** the arrow only ever occupies one position—the one it has at *t*_{0}. Something that only ever occupies one position never moves (subject to refinements about spinning spheres and the like). So at *w** the arrow never moves, and in particular doesn't move at *t*_{0}. But in the actual world, the arrow is in the same state at *t*_{0} as it is at *w** at that time. So in the actual world, the arrow doesn't move at *t*_{0}.

A pretty standard response to The Arrow is that movement is not a function of how an object is at any particular time, it is a function of how, and more precisely where, an object is at multiple times. The velocity of an object at *t*_{0} is the limit of (*x*(*t*_{0}+*h*)−*x*(*t*))/*h* as *h* goes to zero, where *x*(*t*) is the position at *t*, and hence the velocity at *t*_{0} depends on both *x*(*t*_{0}) and on *x*(*t*_{0}+*h*) for small *h*.

Now consider a problem involving Newtonian mechanics. Suppose, contrary to fact, that Newtonian physics is correct.

Then how an object will behave at times *t*>*t*_{0} depends on both the object's position at *t*_{0} *and* on the object's velocity at *t*_{0}. This is basically because of inertia. The forces give rise to a change in velocity, i.e., the acceleration, rather than directly to a change in position: *F*(*t*)=*d**v*(*t*)/*d**t*.

Now here is the puzzle. Start with this plausible thought about how the past affects the future: it does so by means of the present as an intermediary. The Cold War continues to affect geopolitics tomorrow. How? Not by reaching out from the past across a temporal gap, but simply by means of our present memories of the Cold War and the present effects of it. This is a version of the Markov property: how a process will behave in the future depends solely on how it is now. Thus, it seems:

- What happens at times after
*t*_{0} depends on what happens at time *t*_{0}, and only depends on what happens at times prior to *t*_{0} by the mediation of what happens at time *t*_{0}.

But on Newtonian mechanics, how an object will move after time

*t*_{0} depends on its velocity at

*t*_{0}. This velocity is defined in terms of where the object is at

*t*_{0} and where it is at times close to

*t*_{0}. An initial problem is that it also depends on where the object is at times later than

*t*_{0}. This problem can be removed. We can define the velocity here solely in terms of times less than

*t*_{0}, as lim

_{h→0−}(

*x*(

*t*+

*h*)−

*x*(

*t*))/

*h*, i.e., where we take the limit only over negative values of

*h*.

[note 1] But it still remains the case that the velocity at

*t*_{0} is defined in terms of where the object is at times prior to

*t*_{0}, and so how the obejct wil behave at times after

*t*_{0} depends on what happens at times prior

*t*_{0} and not just on what happens at

*t*_{0}, contrary to (1).

Here's another way to put the puzzle. Imagine that God creates a Newtonian world that starts at *t*_{0}. Then in order that the mechanics of the world get off the ground, the objects in the world must have a velocity at *t*_{0}. But any velocity they have at *t*_{0} could only depend on how the world is *after* *t*_{0}, and that just won't do.

Here is a potential move. Take both position and velocity to be fundamental quantities. Then how an object behaves after time *t*_{0} depends on the object's fundamental properties at *t*_{0}, including its velocity then. The fact that *v*(*t*_{0})=lim_{h→0}(*x*(*t*_{0}+*h*)−*x*(*t*_{0}))/*h*, at least at times *t*_{0} not on the boundary of the time sequence, now becomes a law of nature rather than definitional.

But this reneges on our solution to The Arrow. The point of that solution was that velocity is *not* just a matter of how an object is at one time. Here's one way to make the problematic nature of the present suggestion vivid, along the lines of my Sharpened Arrow. Suppose that the arrow is moving at *t*_{0} with non-zero velocity. Imagine a world *w** just like ours at *t*_{0} but does not have any times other than *t*_{0}.[note 2] Then the arrow has a non-zero velocity at *t*_{0} at *w**, even though it is always at exactly the same position. And that sure seems absurd.

The more physically informed reader may have been tempted to scoff a bit as I talked of velocity as fundamental. Of course, there is a standard move in the close vicinity of the one I made, and that is not to take *velocity* as fundamental, but to take *momentum* as fundamental. If we make that move, then we can take it to be a matter of physical law that *m*lim_{h→0}(*x*(*t*_{0}+*h*)−*x*(*t*_{0}))/*h*=*p*(*t*_{0}), where *p*(*t*) is the momentum at *t*.

We still need to embrace the conclusion that an object could fail to ever move and yet at have a momentum (the conclusion comes from arguments like the Sharpened Arrow). But perhaps this conclusion only seems absurd to us non-physicists because we were early on in our education told that momentum is mass times velocity as if that were a definition. But that is definitely not a definition in quantum mechanics. On the suggestion that in Newtonian mechanics we take momentum as fundamental, a suggestion that some formalisms accept, we really should take the fact that momentum is the product of mass and velocity (where velocity is defined in terms of position) to be a law of nature, or a consequence of a law of nature, rather than a definitional truth.

Still, the down-side of this way of proceeding is that we had to multiply fundamental quantities—instead of just position being fundamental, now position and momentum are—and add a new law of nature, namely that momentum is the product of mass and velocity (i.e., of mass and the rate of change of position).

I think something is to be said for a different solution, and that is to reject (1). Then momentum can be a defined quantity—the product of mass and velocity. Granted, the dynamics now has non-Markovian cross-time dependencies. But that's fine. (I have a feeling that this move is a little more friendly to eternalism than to presentism.) If we take this route, then we have another reason to embrace Norton's conclusion that Newtonian mechanics is not always deterministic. For if a Newtonian world had a beginning time *t*_{0}, as in the example involving God creating a Newtonian world, then how the world
is at and prior to *t*_{0} will not determine how the world will behave at later
times. God would have to bring about the initial movements of the objects, and not just the
initial state as such.

Of course, this may all kind of seem to be a silly exercise, since Newtonian physics is false. But it is interesting to think what it would be like if Newtonian physics were true. Moreover, if there are possible worlds where Newtonian physics is true, the above line of thought might be thought to give one some reason to think that (1) is not a necessary truth, and hence give one some reason to think that there could be causation across temporal gaps, which is an interesting and substantive conclusion. Furthermore, the above line of thought also shows how even without thinking about formalisms like Hamiltonian mechanics one might be motivated to take momentum to be a fundamental quantity.

And so Zeno's Arrow continues to be interesting.