Sam is a politician speaking to a large multilingual audience, and is planning on offering them slogans that uniquely appeal to each language group. By coincidence, there is something, s, that he can say which is such that in Elbonian it means that he loves to hunt while in Baratarian s means that he is an avid cyclist. Sam actually loves to hunt but hates cycling, but knows that saying that he loves to hunt will tend to appeal to Elbonian speakers, whom he also tends to respect and does not wish to deceive, and that saying that he is an avid cyclist will tend to appeal to Baratarian speakers. So Sam utters s.
In so doing, Sam is sincerely asserting to Elbonian speakers that he loves to hunt and lying to Baratarian speakers that he is an avid cyclist. But there is Jane in the audience who is a completely bilingual Elbonian and Baratarian speaker. Did Sam lie to Jane?
One might say: It depends on how Jane understood him. But that's not right. To lie to someone does not require the interlocutor to understand one at all. If I write to you in a letter of recommendation that says that Jim is the worst student I have ever had, while in fact I know he is the best student I have ever had, and you misread the "worst" as "best" in the letter (after all, typically, in a letter of recommendation a superlative is positive, so you're primed to read it as "best"), nonetheless I lied to you, but unsuccessfully. Jane might have understood s in Elbonian, or in Baratarian, or just been confused by s. But nonetheless it seems that Sam both lied and spoke sincerely to Jane. He lied to Jane qua Baratarian speaker, since he asserted to all Baratarian speakers that he was an avid cyclist, and he spoke sincerely to all Elbonian speakers, including Jane, that he loved to hunt.
But this is odd. And it also means that it is difficult to make the token the unit of meaning. And that's a problem for nominalists of the Goodman and Quine variety.