Here is an argument against presentism:
- If presentism is true, then to exist is to presently exist.
- Abstracta exist but do not presently exist.
- So, presentism is false.
- The number two existed yesterday and the day before yesterday.
- Anything that existed yesterday and the day before yesterday persisted.
- If growing block or eternalism is true, then persisting objects either have temporal parts or have locational properties.
- The number two does not have temporal parts.
- The number two does not have locational properties.
- If presentism is not true, growing block or eternalism is true.
- So, presentism is true.
My own take on the second argument is to distinguish between two senses of "x exists at t". The first sense is that x has tenseless existence-at-t. This we might call the narrow sense. But there is a broader sense of "x exists at t", which is that either x exists timelessly or x has existence-at-t. Ordinary language tends to use the second sense. If we take the broader sense in (4) and (5), I accept (4) (though with a divine conceptualist reduction) and deny (5). If we take the narrower sense, I deny (4) but accept (5).