- (Premise) All instances of severe suffering of small children are unjust.
- (Premise) Only things agents are responsible for are unjust.
- So, all instances of severe suffering of small children are things that agents are responsible for.
- If (3), then naturalism is false.
A quick argument for (1): all unfair things are unjust, and all such instances are unfair. The naturalist will, I think, in the end want to deny (1) if she is to remain a naturalist. However I do think a lot of people have a strong intuition that such suffering is not just really bad, but that it is unjust.
Premise (2) is very plausible.
I think (4) is plausible, as well. For while some cases of severe suffering of children are things agents are responsible for even if naturalism is true—say, suffering directly imposed by agents—there will be many cases which are not like that. Say, a couple lovingly procreates in order to share their good life with a child, and the child has a congenital disease that causes severe suffering. There is no naturalistically-acceptable agential explanation.
What sort of non-naturalistic agential explanation could be given of these injustices? Here are the three most obvious options:
- An evil deity.
- A devil.
- The Fall.
Which is the right story? Well, it's not an evil deity and it's not reincarnation.