I just had a really naive thought. Let's imagine what a definition of animals would be like. It would say something like this: Animals are things that maintain homeostasis, take in nutrients and grow, reproduce, initiate and control a large variety of types of motion in response to changing environmental features, etc. It's not very easy to come up with details of the definition, but it seems like it would go something like this. Well, it's pretty clear that we do these things, as well as doing any plausible items we'd want to add to the definition. So we're animals. Case closed.
What could an anti-animalist say? I guess her best hope would be: The definition is close to the truth, but not quite. Rather, animals are things that non-derivatively maintain homeostasis, take in nutrients and grow, etc., etc. But it seems to me that there is a natural dilemma. Derivative homeostasis (say) either is or is not a case of homeostasis. If it is, that seems all we need for animalhood (along with analogous other qualities). If it is not, then the anti-animalist can't say that we have homeostasis, and that's absurd.
22 comments:
Anti-animalists feel the second horn fairly sharply, I think, which is why a great many of them have said things like "we are animals, but only in a derivative sense". And for what it's worth, I've got an article exploring some of the consequences (the punchline: animalism itself follows): http://andrewmbailey.com/YouAreAnAnimal.pdf
And if derivatively P entails P, then you have animalism.
Animalism shouldn't say we're nonderivatively animals. All positive qualities of creatures are likely derivative from God's attributes.
We are the highest of the animals and the lowest of the spirits.
If animalism is the view that we are *essentially* animals, then more remains to be shown, no? (From "I (derivatively) exercise voting rights as a U.S. citizen," it doesn't follow from that that I'm essentially a U.S. citizen!)
I am taking animalism to be just the view that we are animals now. I think it's a serious possibility that while we're animals now, we cease to be animals at death, and then resume at resurrection.
I wonder if teleology wouldn't help the anti-animalist. Perhaps an animal is something for which, say, the telos of reproduction is the primary telos, while for us it's just one telos among many.
I am taking animalism to be just the view that we are animals now. I think it's a serious possibility that while we're animals now, we cease to be animals at death, and then resume at resurrection
That seems strange. If the view is that we have the property of being animals. then that seems obviously true. But I thought the question was whether we are identical to animals. That's not so obvious.
Mike:
If you have the property of being an F, you are an F. So this is a valid argument:
1. Mike has the property of being an animal.
2. So, Mike is an animal.
But now we just have an FOL-valid proof:
3. Animal(mike) (assumption, paraphrase of 2)
4. mike = mike (=-intro)
5. Animal(mike) and mike = mike (conjunction-intro, 3,4)
6. Ex(Animal(x) and mike = x) (existential-intro, 5)
But (6) paraphrases: There is an animal that Mike is identical with.
Or, equivalently: Mike is identical with an animal.
Alex,
I have no doubt that I am identical to something that has he property of being an animal. That's true. But I am not identical to an animal. Let A name the animal to which I am allegedly identical. Then it is true that M = A. But then it is also true that ☐(M = A). So, I am an animal in every world in which I exist. That conclusion is too strong. I am also identical to something that has the property of being left-handed, but I am not left handed in every world in which I exist.
There is a difference (as I know you know) between being identical to something that is contingently an animal and being identical to an animal. You could put that another way: there is a difference between having 'being an animal' predicated of you and being identical to an animal.
Mike, I do not know whether you need to brush up on your classical logic, or explicitly endorse non-classical logic. But you are describing a view, so far as I can tell, on which you are contingently identical to an animal. In classical logic, there is no contingent identity. So either you embrace non-classical logic, or you have made an error in your (classical) reasoning.
The error in your first paragraph is that if Nec(Mike=A), and Mike is not an animal in every possible world, then A is not an animal in every possible world either. Animals need not be essentially animals.
Thanks for the logic advice, Heath. Maybe I can clarify. I did not say that I was contingently identical to an animal. What I said was that I am identical to something that has the property of being an animal. I am also identical to something that has the property of being contingently left handed. Nor did I say anything that entailed that all animals are essentially animals.
I said this. If A names the animal (recall that names are rigid) ot which I an allegedly identical, then it is true that M = A. But since both 'M' and 'A' are rigid, it follows that ☐(M = A). All true identity claims involving rigid designators are necessarily true.
Maybe I'm missing your criticism.
Mike:
"What I said was that I am identical to something that has the property of being an animal."
1. For all x, if x is something that has the property of being an animal, then x is an animal.
2. So, if you are identical to something that has the property of being an animal, then you are identical to an animal.
Do you accept (1)? If you accept (1), do you accept that (2) follows logically from (1)?
Alex,
I thought I was agreeing with you on this score. What I want to distinguish is between what the animalist means when he says that we are animals, and what you're saying above. What the animalist means when he says that Mike = an animal is something like this:
1. In every world in which Mike exists, Mike = an animal.
I take (1) to be saying something like 'Mike is fundamentally an animal' or
1'. Mike is identical to something that is essentially an animal.
It is analogous to what the Cartesian means when he says 'Mike = a soul'. The Cartesian does not mean that Mike is identical to something that happens to be ensouled. But if (1') is right, then your claim (C) seems false.
C. I am taking animalism to be just the view that we are animals now. I think it's a serious possibility that while we're animals now, we cease to be animals at death, and then resume at resurrection.
So, maybe we just disagree about what the animalist is saying. You seem to take him to be saying something like (2).
2. Mike is identical to something that is contingently an animal.
I'm pretty sure that is not the view. In any case, it is good to keep (1') distinct from (2). When I hear identity claims in the context of persistence, I always hear them as analogous to (1').
Mike,
If A names the animal (recall that names are rigid) ot which I an allegedly identical, then it is true that M = A. But since both 'M' and 'A' are rigid, it follows that ☐(M = A). All true identity claims involving rigid designators are necessarily true.
That's all fine. But it does not follow that
So, I am an animal in every world in which I exist."
What follows is that, in every world in which you exist, you are identical to something which is actually (in this world) an animal.
Mike,
Your most recent reply to Alex makes good sense and clarifies the point at issue.
Heath
Mike:
I am reliably informed (by a grad student working on this topic) that Eric Olson expressly limits his animalism to the claim that we are actually animals, and makes no claim that we are essentially animals. And Olson is paradigmatically an animalist.
Alex,
That's interesting. I took the animalist position to be the one expressed in the Blatti SEP entry according to which animalism asserts that I am fundamentally an animal. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/animalism/). He offers this modal formulation.
☐(x)(x is a human person ⟶ x is an animal)
That does not seem consistent with Olson's view, as you characterize it. But even supposing you're right about Olson's view, and we are actually (and contingently) animals, (C) would still be false. I'm reading your 'possibility' as an epistemic possibility in (C).
C. I am taking animalism to be just the view that we are animals now. I think it's a serious possibility that while we're animals now, we cease to be animals at death, and then resume at resurrection.
Let the criteria for persistence in the actual world be P. According to Olson, meeting the criteria in P determines whether we actually persist. At death, there is no chance that, my body ceases and I continue to live. At death, I'm still in the actual world, and P still determines whether I persist. So, I can't see the epistemic possibility that animalism is contingently true and I actually live on after bodily death. But perhaps I'm not reading C the right way
Alex,
I should say that, even granting the modal formulation of animalism above, you might still say that we can continue to live as non-animals if ther is a world in which we exist, we are not human persons and we are not animals. That of course would require taking the view that we are not essentially human persons. Anyway, for what it's worth.
Above I was trying to press Mike's question. If animalism says that 'human being' is a phase sortal of mine, I can't think of any participant in the personal identity debates who denies it. (Of course, many would deny the intermediate view you're holding out for, i.e., that necessarily, for as long as this human animal here exists, it = Sherif, and so on for other human persons.)
sgirgis: a number of folks working on personal identity and personal ontology deny that we are human beings (even as a phase sortal). Brainists like (current) Derek Parfit come to mind. See his "We Are Not Human Beings". Those who endorse various four-dimensional ontologies of the human person (like Hud Hudson) join the denial. See his "I am not an animal!".
Ah, good points. I had forgotten about Parfit's change and didn't know about Hudson. (I had been thinking that 4D-ists like Lewis could still affirm the weaker form of animalism.)
I endorse a 4D ontology, but I think I'm an animal. :-)
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