Alice was tortured for weeks, but she remained loyal to the true and the good. Alice’s moral victory over her torturers was of great value. Let’s take it for granted that this situation represents something that is on balance a great good for Alice (and for the world). But suppose that God was choosing between Alice’s moral victory, on the one hand, and Alice doing something else that was virtuous, worthwhile but not painful—perhaps with great singlemindedness throwing herself into producing a great work of art. One might well make the judgment that while Alice’s moral victory was a great good, given the horrendous cost to Alice, it would on balance have been better for God to have steered her life away from the suffering and towards a good that comes without much pain.
I am sceptical of this judgment, but for the sake of the argument let’s grant it. Nonetheless, I think the assessment should change if one adds to the above a story about an infinite heavenly afterlife. Here is why. The judgment was that while there was great value in Alice’s moral victory, it would have been good to substitute a painless but valuable achievement for it.
But what if, instead, the question was this:
- Is it better for Alice to have the painful moral victory plus a hundred painless but valuable achievements, or just the hundred painless but valuable achievements?
If we grant the initial judgment that Alice’s moral victory was of great value, then we need to say that the first option is on balance better. The life with the painful victory and hundred painless achievements not only exhibits the additional good of the painful victory, but also exhibits the higher-order value of a diversity of types of goods.
Now ask this question:
- Is it better for Alice to have the painful moral victory plus an infinite number of painless but valuable achievements, or just the infinite number of painless but valuable achievements?
It sure seems like the first option is the better one. But now when we ask the initial question, whether God shouldn’t have given Alice a painless achievement instead, in the context of a theory of God that includes an infinite happy afterlife, that is in fact what the question comes to. The additional painless achievement would not add much to the infinitely many painless achievements in heaven. But the painful achievement adds something different in kind.
And when we add to the story that in the afterlife Alice (as well as her friends, likely many in number) will be able to enjoy, infinitely many times, the memory of her moral victory, without the memory of her suffering being itself a source of suffering (for, I take it, there is no suffering in heaven), it sure seems worth it.
But what if instead Alice cracked under torture, thereby losing the good? Well, now how well the story works depends on other questions. If we have Molinism, then it doesn’t work very well: given Molinism, God can foresee that Alice would crack, and so the value that there would be in her victory is irrelevant. But given simple foreknowledge (or open theism, but that’s a heretical option) God’s decision whether to put Alice in that situation can only be based on chances. For all we know, the chance of Alice’s cracking under torture, given the grace that God gave her, was not very high, and so the significant chance of the great goods of having a diversity in the types of goods one experiences and of having an infinite number of reminiscences of that diversity was worthwhile. Or, at least, we have little reason to think it wasn’t.
4 comments:
Dr Pruss
The problem I have with this is that in order for God to get off the hook for allowing pain in Alice's life we have to ask,
"Is it better for Alice to have the painful moral victory plus an infinite number of painless but valuable achievements, or the painless moral victory plus an infinite number of painless but valuable achievements?"
We shouldn't presuppose that painless moral victories are impossible, and if they aren't, then the second option seems to be the best.
I am also not sure how simple foreknowledge implies that God's decision whether to put Alice in that situation can be based on chances. That seems to imply open theism, which you reject as a heresy. Because when exactly does God get the "simple foreknowledge" about which choice Alice will make? Does God really play dice after all?
But wouldn't a painful moral victory plus an infinite number of painless ones be better than just an infinite number of painless ones, because of the greater diversity in types of victories?
On the simple foreknowledge picture, God's knowledge of how Alice will act is explanatorily, but not temporally, posterior to God's deciding to put Alice in that situation. In other words, God's decision whether to put Alice in that situation cannot be affected by his knowledge of how Alice will act.
"But wouldn't a painful moral victory plus an infinite number of painless ones be better than just an infinite number of painless ones, because of the greater diversity in types of victories?"
Only if "better" means "more diverse", which would be a strange definition of "better" and which would entail that an infinite number of painful victories plus an infinite number of painless oness would be the best possible outcome. In that case, heaven would have to be a place/condition with an infinity of pain as well as an infinity of pleasure. That may be a possibility, but I fear it is a heresy too.
On the foreknowledge thing, I believe that with this definition of foreknowlegde you don't need a theodicy because whatever evil in the world can be accounted for by God's ignorance of what the result of his creation is going to be. I fear you are getting dangerously close to a heresy here, not to mention the problems this view has for God's alleged immutability.
More diverse in goods is one way of being better. Not all cases of diversity will, however, be worth having _on balance_. I think that inserting a painful moral victory into an infinite sequence of painless is worth it, but inserting infinitely many might not be.
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