Friday, June 16, 2017

Optimalism about necessity

There are many set-theoretic claims that are undecidable from the basic axioms of set theory. Plausibly, the truths of set theory hold of necessity. But it seems to be arbitrary which undecidable set-theoretic claims are true. And if we say that the claims are contingent, then it will be arbitrary which claims are contingent. We don’t want there to be any of the “arbitrary” in the realm of necessity. Or so I say. But can we find a working theory of necessity that eliminates the arbitrary?

Here are two that have a hope. The first is a variant on Leslie-Rescher optimalism. While Leslie and Rescher think that the best (narrowly logically) scenario must obtain, and hence endorse an optimalism about truth, we could instead affirm an optimalism about necessity:

  1. Among the collections of propositions, that collection of propositions that would make for the best collection of all the necessary truths is in fact the collection of all the necessary truths.

And just as it arguably follows from Leslie-Rescher optimalism that there is a God, since it is best that there be one, it arguably follows from this optimalism about necessity that there necessarily is a God, since it is best that there necessarily be a God. (By the way, when I once talked with Rescher about free will, he speculatively offered me something that might be close to optimalism about necessity.)

Would that solve the problem? Maybe: maybe the best possible—both practically and aesthetically—set theory is the one that holds of necessary truth.

I am not proposing this theory as a theory of what necessity is, but only of what is in fact necessary. Though, I suppose, one could take the theory to be a theory of what necessity is, too.

Alternately, we could have an optimalist theory about necessity that is theistic from the beginning:

  1. A maximally great being is the ground of all necessity.

And among the great-making properties of a maximally great being there are properties like “grounding a beautiful set theory”.

I suspect that (1) and (2) are equivalent.

2 comments:

bethyada said...

Despite having read this several times I don't understanding much after the first paragraph. Still, a couple of questions about your premises.

1. Among the collections of proportions, that collection of propositions that would make for the best collection of the necessary truths is in fact the collection of the necessary truths

Should this read "propositions" both times?

Should I be reading "the" as "all"?

Alexander R Pruss said...

Yes to both. I'm fixing it... Good catch.