Life in the interim state and the nature of time

Assume this thesis:

1. We go out of existence at death and return to existence at the resurrection.

Suppose, further, that:

2. There is a last moment t₁ of earthly life and a first moment t₂ of resurrected life.

Then:

3. If there are no intervening moments of time between t₁ and t₂, one is never dead.

4. Whether there are any intervening moments of time between t₁ and t₂ depends on what happens to things other than one.

5. So, whether one is ever dead depends on what happens to things other than one.

6. So, whether one is ever dead is extrinsic to one.

But that’s absurd in itself, plus it implies the absurdity that death is only an extrinsic harm. So, we should reject 1. We exist between death and the resurrection.

There are two controversial assumptions in the argument: 2 and 4. Assumption 4 follows from an Aristotelian picture of time as consisting in the changes of things. Since one doesn’t exist between t₁ and t₂, those changes would have to be happening to things other than oneself. If one doesn’t accept the Aristotelian picture of time, it’s much harder to argue for 4.

Assumption 2 is obviously true if time is discrete. If time is continuous, it might or might not be true. For instance, it could be that one lives from time 0 to time 100, both inclusive, in which case t₁ = 100, but it could also be that one lives from time 0 to time 100, non-inclusive, in which case t₁ doesn’t exist. Similarly, one could be resurrected from time 3000, inclusive, to time infinity, non-inclusive, in which case t₂ = 3000, but it could also be that one is resurrected from time 3000, non-inclusive, in which case t₂ doesn’t exist.

However, even in the continuous case the argument has some force. For, first of all, it’s obvious that death is an intrinsic harm to us, and that obviousness does not depend on obscure details about whether the intervals of one’s life include their endpoints. Second, it is at least metaphysically possible for 1 to hold. But then in a world where 1 were to hold, our death would be merely an extrinsic harm to us, which would still be absurd.